

A
LETTER

TO

Mr. DODWELL,

CONCERNING

The Immortality of the SOUL
of MAN.

In ANSWER to One from Him,
relating to the same Matter.

Being a farther Pursuance of the
Philosophical Discourse.

By JOHN NORRIS, M. A.
Rector of Bemerton.

L O N D O N :

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LETTER

WEDDING

The Journal of the SOUL

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In a NEW... to One from the...

Medical Discharge

JOHN... M. A.

LONDON

Printed by...

T O T H E
R E A D E R.

THIS being a farther persuance of the Philosophical Discourse, about the Natural Immortality of the Soul, and proceeding pretty much upon the Principles there laid, I must desire him that shall think the Contents of these Papers worthy of his perusal, that he would be pleased to read the other first. Which will be both Justice to me, and an Advantage to himself, as being as good a Preparative for the reading of this, as any thing I can say by way of Preface here, and therefore I need not say very much.

The Argument of these Papers is highly worth thy Consideration, if the Management of it be. And therefore I would not have him that takes them up, upon the mere sight of the Title gravely to lay them down again, saying, that he is well enough satisfy'd of

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the Immortality of the Soul. *It may be so. But however 'tis one thing to believe the Article, and another thing to understand the Proposition. And that not only as to the Grounds and Reasons of it, so as to be able to demonstrate its Truth at large, but also as to the particular state and manner of it, so as to have a clear Notion how and in what sense it is true, which is the great Design of this Undertaking to explain. And which in it self is as necessary to be rightly understood, that so we may neither ascribe to the Soul an Immortality which she is not capable of, nor defraud her of that which is her just and natural Right. Since as the latter cannot be done without injury to the Soul, so neither can the former without being injurious to the Peculiar Dignity, and incommunicable Excellence of that Great Being, upon whom she and all Creatures essentially depend.*

I think I have avoided both these Inconveniencies; and if in order to my doing so I found it necessary not to depart so widely as some do from my Learned Adversary, but to comply with him so far in his Position of the Natural Mortality of the Soul, as to yield it to be indeed Naturally Mortal with respect to Being, I hope the considerate Reader will not take any Offence at the seeming largeness

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largeness of this Concession ; since besides the Rational Grounds upon which it stands, it will be found not to be without the Suffrage of very good Antiquity. For which I appeal to the 64th Chapter of the Second Book of Irenæus. Where he plainly resolves the Immortality of the Soul as to Existence into the Will and Free Constitution of God. And if the Soul be as to perseverance in Being positively or by Divine Constitution Immortal, then it must (in that respect) be Naturally Mortal. As the Father plainly intimates it is, when he says, Non ex nobis, neq; ex nostrâ Naturâ Vita est, sed secundum gratiam Dei datur. And again, Anima ipsa non est Vita, participatur autem a Deo sibi præstitam Vitam. Again most plainly, Deo Vitam & perpetuam perseverantiam donante capiunt Animæ primum non existentes, dehinc perseverare, cum eas Deus & esse & subsistere voluerit. Principari enim debet in omnibus & dominari voluntas Dei. So that both the Being of the Soul, and its Perseverance in Being is all resolv'd here by this early Christian Writer into the pure Will of God, disclaiming all Pretences to either from any Foundation in its own Nature. But however if we have no such Immortality by Nature, yet if we can claim another upon this stock, and
have

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have even this by Grace, I think it is very well, and we have more reason to study how to make a good use of that Immortality we have, than to dispute or contend for more.

*As to what I say Page 120, of the three constituent parts of Man, Soul, Body and Spirit, I would not be understood by way of Positive Assertion, but only to speak in favour of that antient piece of Philosophy; for which however the Authority of the Apostle, 1 Theff. 5. 23. seems very plain; first from his using the words ὁλοτελής and ὁλόκληρον, which import a Totality or Integrity, and then by reckoning the several Parts afterwards distinctly. But this is what I need not insist upon, it being enough to my purpose that Spirit is here ascribed to Man as a Constituent Part of his Nature; but whether it be a third Part or no is not material, so it be but allow'd to be a real Part. And so much at least is plain, tho' Irenæus goes farther in the place there quoted, making it not only a Part, but a third Part according to a distinct enumeration. Sunt tria ex quibus perfectus Homo constat, &c. Only I should there have observ'd, and therefore think fit to do it here, that he * seems to*

* See Chap. 9. of the 5th Book *adversus Hæreses*, compared with Chap. 6. of the same Book.

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refer this Spirit to the Spirit of the Father, which I confess I know not what to make of. For how can this agree to the words of St. Paul, The God of Peace sanctify you wholly, and let the whole of you, Spirit, Soul, and Body, be preserv'd blameless. For in the first place, how can the Spirit of the Father be a Constituent Part of our Whole? And besides, how can the Spirit of the Father be sanctify'd and preserv'd blameless? Or if it could, how is that the sanctifying or preserving the whole of us? And what a Prayer would it be for the Apostle to make, that the Spirit of the Father which is the Sanctifier of his People, should it self be sanctify'd and preserv'd blameless till the coming of the Lord Jesus. Besides, how is Irenæus here consistent with himself, in making three distinct things whereof a perfect Man does consist, when yet one of them is no part of him at all. But 'tis not impossible for the Fathers of the Church to misunderstand and misapply Scripture, as well as to fail in their rational Deductions. And indeed, unless it be in Case of Testimony and Matters of Fact, I don't find but that they are to be read with as much Discretion, and liberty of Private Judgment, as other Writers,

1761

A LETTER

ERRATA.

Page 81. l. 13. for *them*, read *the*, p. 98. l. 10. for *possible*, read *possibly*.

Note, that page 13. line 12. instead of, *tho' they use the Word Law*,
I would have it read, *tho' they should use the Word Law*.

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All Written by the Reverend Mr. John Norris, Rector
of Embsay near Sarum.

A
L E T T E R
T O

Mr. *D O D W E L L*,

Concerning the Immortality of the
S O U L of Man.

S I R,

IT might otherwise have appear'd as a presumptuous Forwardness, for one of my Meanness to write to a Person of your Eminence, if you had not by your preventing Condescension obliged, and even invited me to it. But since you have been pleas'd to do me so great an Honour, as to write to me, and withal seem desirous of my farther Thoughts upon this Important Subject, I know not well how to excuse my self, either to the Public or to
B you,

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you, from making some Return to so undeserv'd a Favour. Only I would not be thought to do it out of a pertinacious humour of Contending, but for the Clearing of the Truth, and the better Information of my own Mind. For indeed 'tis the right of the *thing* that we ought mainly to be concern'd for, and not on whose *side* it shall be found. Nor shall I think it any Disgrace, or Disreputation, to me, if it should be found on *yours*, as not pretending so much to ingage with you as an *Adversary*, as to learn from you as a *Master*.

2. Sir, you bestow too great an Honour upon me in congratulating your self, that you have hit upon the same Thoughts as mine. However tho' the Countenance of so mean an Authority can be no great Satisfaction to you, or Advantage to your Cause, yet I must freely own and declare to you, that I do indeed concur with you so far in your asserting the *Natural Mortality* of the Soul, as to allow the Soul to be Naturally Mortal as to *Being* or Existence, tho' not Absolutely so. For indeed to resume the Principles of the *Philosophical Discourse* (tho' by putting the Argument of it in a different posture) if the Soul were Naturally Immortal as to *Being*, then Being must be supposed to flow from its
very

very Nature, in like manner as other Natural Properties do from the Nature of their Subjects. But now Being is not essential to any Creature, as not being contain'd in the Idea, or formal conception of it. *Ergo.* Besides, if Being did immediately flow from the Nature of the Soul (as it must if it be in *that* sense naturally Immortal) then it would be necessary for the Soul to *be*, and so the Soul would be a necessary and independent Being, as necessary and independent as God himself is. For wherein lies the Necessity and Independency of the Divine Nature but only in this, that Being is essential to him, and results from his very Essence, so that he cannot but *be*. But now if Being flows from the Nature of the Soul (and there is no avoiding that, if it be said to be in that sense naturally Immortal) then 'tis plain that the Soul has the very same foundation for necessary Existence that God himself has, and is as necessary and independent a Being. This absurd Consequence indeed does not follow in the other way of Immortality, that of *Incorruptibility*. For tho' the Soul should be allow'd to be naturally Immortal in that sense, as having Incorruptibility flowing from its Nature, yet that can only be supposing it to have

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an actual Existence. And if that be only a possible and contingent Event, 'tis plain that upon the *whole*, the Soul is only a possible and contingent, not a necessary Being. But if Being it self be once admitted to be natural to it, then it must be as necessary for it to be, as upon that Supposition it would be to be Incorruptible. But now the Soul is not a necessary, but a possible or contingent Being. *Ergo*. Again once more, If the Soul were naturally Immortal as to *Being*, it would not need the Concurrence of the Divine Influence to support it in Being. For what occasion is there for an external Help to maintain it in that, which is supposed immediately to flow from the inward Principles of its own Nature. But such a Concurrence it does need, and by the Consent of the best Philosophers and Divines is allow'd to do so. And therefore, if the Soul has any natural Immortality belonging to her, 'tis plain that it cannot be that of *Being*; and I cannot but wonder that any considering Person, especially they that suppose the Soul to be in such a State of Dependence, as not to be able to subsist without the Divine Influence supporting her, should ascribe any such Immortality to her. For these things seem to me if not contradictory,

story, yet plainly inconsistent with one another.

3. And here, Sir, you tell me that your other Adversaries agree with me, in granting you that Human Souls cannot secure their own Existence, if God should be pleas'd even to withdraw his Influence from them ; which it seems they allow to be necessary for the continuance of their Existence, upon the account of that general Dependence, which is essential to Creatures as such. Very well. But then truly I do not see with what self-consistency they can affirm the Natural Immortality of the Soul as to *Being*, of which they acknowledge it to have so precarious a tenure ; this being all one, in my Opinion, as if they should say, that *Adam* was naturally Immortal, and yet that he could not live for ever without the *Tree of Life*. Nor do I see what can be said here, unless they will make the Natural Immortality of the Soul, as to *Being*, to consist in this, that it needs no *more* than God's *ordinary* Concurrence to be preserv'd in it. But besides that this, if it were admitted as a ground of Natural Immortality, would make every thing else naturally Immortal as well as the Soul, there being nothing but what will subsist in *Being* with the help

help of that *Concurrence*, 'tis farther to be noted, that its needing no more does not so much prove it to be naturally Immortal, as its needing so much proves the contrary. For Natural Immortality (according to the Principles of the Philosophical Discourse) being that which flows from the Nature of a Thing, any Assistance, be it ordinary or extraordinary, superadded to that Nature, is utterly inconsistent with a *Natural* Immortality. And indeed, properly speaking, with respect to the Nature assisted, 'tis *all extraordinary* whatever is superadded to it, tho' with respect either to the degree or manner of the Assistance it self, some may be call'd Ordinary, and some Extraordinary. But this Distinction has no place as to the nature of the thing assisted by the Divine Concourse, but only respects the Order and Oeconomy of the Divine Providence, whereby Things are both preserv'd and govern'd. Which I think deserves to be particularly observ'd.

4. Thus far then these Gentlemen either do, or should agree both with you and me. They *do* it seems agree with me in making the Soul dependent upon the Divine Influence, for its Continuance in Being; and they *should* also, for that very Reason, agree with me in making it not to be Naturally

turally but Positively Immortal, as to that same Being which they acknowledge to be so dependent. For that is an unavoidable Consequence of their own Principle. And I cannot but wonder, that since the Principle is so generally held by the Consent of Fathers, Philosophers and School Divines, that the Consequence, which so visibly flows from it, is so little heeded, and no farther Insisted upon than it is. Indeed as to Immortality of *Incorruption*, as that is quite another Thing, so 'tis also quite another Case. For that being supposed to result immediately from the very Nature of the Soul it self when once put in Being, without needing any superaccessary external Support, the Soul may well, in that sense, be said to be naturally Immortal, notwithstanding its being otherwise dependent for its Preservation. But certainly, so far as it is dependent upon any thing without it self, (which is its Case intirely as to *Being*) in that respect I do not see how its Natural Immortality can be maintain'd, or how they are consistent with themselves, who upon that Supposition do maintain it. And therefore methinks it should be no *Heresy* to assert the Soul to be in this sense *Naturally Mortal*.

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5. We are therefore, or at least *should* be, thus far all agreed. But, Sir, you say that they differ from you in this, that they think God is not at liberty to deny what is requisite on his part for perpetuating Human Souls, on account of their Nature as establish'd by himself, at first Arbitrarily, as being then at liberty not to have establish'd it so, but that he is since obliged by another arbitrary Determination, never to depart from the Rules of his First Establishments, even in Particulars which were acknowledg'd Arbitrary when first establish'd. But truly, Sir, this Account I do not well understand. For in the first place, How not at Liberty? For notwithstanding any Determination, or Decree, whereby these ingenious Gentlemen may suppose God to have obliged himself, yet I presume they will not deny but that Absolutely speaking, or as the Schools say *de Potentiâ Absolutâ* God may, and so is at *liberty* to withdraw from any or all his Creatures that conservative Influence of his whereby they subsist. Or else it would not be in his Power to *annihilate* them; there being no other way of doing that but by such a subtraction. And how come they to know that there is any such Determination, or Decree, that
may

may restrain this absolute Liberty, especially since they acknowledge it to be an *Arbitrary* one? Again Secondly, How comes this Arbitrary Decree to be grounded on the *Nature* of the Soul? Is there any thing in the *Nature* of the Soul that requires any such Decree? There may indeed be enough in the Soul that *needs* it, but I do not see what it has in its *Nature* that should *require* it, and least of all upon the supposition of its being naturally Immortal as to *Being*, because then it would be able to subsist well enough without it. But if its *Nature* does not require such a Decree, how come they to know it; and if it does, how comes it to be Arbitrary? How comes a Natural Exigence to be the Foundation of an Arbitrary Decree? Besides Thirdly, If the *Nature* of the Soul be an Arbitrary Establishment, then it is acknowledged not to be a Necessary, but a Contingent Being; and how then can it be Naturally Immortal in that very respect wherein it is Contingent? In another respect it may, but sure not in that. And if the *Decree*, whereby God is suppos'd to have obliged himself be as *Arbitrary* as the *Nature*, then 'tis all over Arbitrary, and so no Pretence either from within or from without for a *Natural* Im-

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mortality,

mortality, which seems every way excluded. But after all, in the last place, Suppose that God were not at liberty to deny what is requisite on his part for the subsistence of Human Souls, I do not see how their Natural Immortality as to Being, can be prov'd upon this Hypothesis, or even maintain'd *with* it. They might, and would be naturally Mortal for all this, nay even *by* this. Their Duration indeed would hereby be perpetuated and secured, and so they would be actually *immortaliz'd*, and acquire a sort of Immortality. But what Immortality would it be; not a Natural, but a *Positive* Immortality; this being the very Notion and Difference of a Positive Immortality, that it derives from a Cause extrinsical to the thing whose Property it is. And then tho' it be never so well secured, it matters not. For 'tis not the Certainty or Security of the Duration, but the Principle from whence it flows, that distinguishes a Natural from a Positive Immortality. And therefore I do not very well understand to what purpose this is insisted upon.

6. It seems to me that this Account, so far as it is right, may be more properly and intelligibly applied to the other sort of Immortality, that of *Incorruption*. For
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here indeed it may be said, That the Nature of the Soul tho' it be in the first Institution of it, or as to its *Existence*, an Arbitrary Establishment, yet has certain Properties essentially belonging to it, and involv'd in its very Essence, (as indeed every Nature has) whereof this is one, that it is Incorruptible or Indissoluble. And accordingly, tho' God was at liberty whether he would give his *Fiat* for the actual Existence of such a Nature, as indeed he is still absolutely speaking whether he will continue it, yet being once put in Being, such a Property as Incorruptibility will result from it, not by any Will or Arbitrary Determination (for that respects only the *Existence*) but by its Ideal Reason or Essence, containing such a Property in it, as much as the Essence of Human Nature contains in it the Property of *Risibility*. So that tho' there is no necessity it should be, yet if it be at all it cannot be without it. And so the Soul, however Positive and Contingent as to Being, may yet as to Incorruption be said to have a Natural Immortality, not Antecedently or Absolutely (for so God only, to whom Being is essential, is Immortal) but in a sense Posterious and Consequential to its Constitution,

stitution, as is more at large explain'd in the *Philosophical Discourse*.

7. It would therefore perhaps better become *me*, who own the Soul to be naturally Mortal as to Being, and that all the Immortality which it has in that respect is only Positive, to have recourse to such a Determination (could I tell upon what to fix it) whereby God might oblige himself to afford his Influential Concurrence, that so the Soul might be the more secure of that Immortality by *Position*, which it has not from *Nature*. But you say, that since I own a Natural Disposition in the Soul to not Being, I cannot pretend any such Law from the Nature of the Soul. Why truly I do not pretend to any such Law *at all*, because I know nothing of it, and therefore to be sure not from its *Nature*. Neither indeed do I well understand how God can be said to oblige himself by any Arbitrary Law. Such Laws indeed he may impose upon his Creatures ; but I know not whether he himself can be obliged by any other Law than this *general* one, always to act like himself, in conformity to the Dictates of his Infallible Wisdom, and according to the Immutable Perfections of his Nature ; And that indeed is a Law to him,

him, and what he cannot act against ; but as to his particular Wills (what we commonly call *Decrees*) as concerning the making of a World, or the like, I do not see how they can be properly Laws to *him*, tho' they may be so to *us*, because in themselves not absolutely binding as the other is, and as all Law must be, but only upon supposition of his having once will'd them, because all his Wills are Eternal and Immutable. And perhaps this is what they mean, (tho' they use the word *Law*) that God had from Eternity a Particular Will, as concerning the Creating such Beings, so also for the perpetual Conservation of them ; which tho' it cannot properly be call'd a Law with respect to God, as having no Obligation of it self antecedently to his willing it, yet 'tis what he cannot afterwards depart from, supposing he has form'd within himself any such particular Will. But then the Supposition it self of his having so done, seems to me a little too precarious. But however this be, I do not pretend to any such Law ; tho' why I *might* not as well as those who stand for the Natural Immortality of the Soul with respect to Being, or why I *must* not for the *reason* you are pleas'd to assign, *viz.* because I own a Natural Disposition in the Soul

Soul to not Being, I do not so well understand. For as to the First, Methinks I may have as much, rather more Reason than they, since if the Soul be naturally Immortal as to Being, it would need no interposing Act of God to perpetuate its Existence, nor consequently any Law or Determination about it. And as to the Second, Whereas you say that I can't pretend any such thing, because I own the Soul to have a natural tendency to not Being, I do not well apprehend the Force of this Inference. For tho' that be no Reason *for* such a Determination, yet at the same time it is no Reason *against* it. And I must needs say farther, that tho' it does not infer it, yet it better comports with it than a Natural Immortality as to Being does, which indeed wholly supersedes it, as a thing for which upon that ground there is no manner of occasion.

8. However, Sir, you are so far in the right, that I do not pretend any Law from the *Nature* of the *Soul* that may oblige God Almighty to continue it in Being, or so bind him up that he may not be at liberty to deny what is requisite on his part to that purpose. Only there is one thing wherein I should be glad to be instructed by you, and that is, whether there may
not

not be something in his *own* Nature that may hinder him from annihilating any of his Creatures, by withdrawing from them his necessary Concurrence. Here I might argue (as some do) from the *Immutability* of God, and inquire, tho' Absolutely speaking it be in his Power to do so, yet whether it may consist with that *steady* Attribute of his actually to exert that Power. Whether it agrees with the Oeconomy of an Immutable Being, or stands with the Uniformity of his Conduct thus to do and undo, to make and unmake, since this seems to argue *Repentance*, and looks as if God, upon second Thoughts, disapproved of his first Will, and so retracted it, and unwill'd it again. This indeed seems to carry in it an Appearance of considerable Difficulty; the true Stress and Pinch of which I conceive to lye in this, Whether the Annihilation of a Creature, or that Substraction of God's Concurrence whereby it is effected, does necessarily import any real Change in the Divine Will. If it does, I think the Argument will be demonstrative; it being most certain not only from the *Immutability* of God, but also from the Perfection of his *Wisdom*, that there can be no Change *there*. And accordingly, tho' God does not will any thing

thing necessarily out of himself absolutely speaking, but is absolutely free to will or not to will it, because nothing is necessarily lovely but himself, yet upon supposition that he wills any thing, he owes so much to the Perfection of his own immutable Nature as to will it necessarily, so as never to depart from that Will. But the Argument supposes that he does in the Case of *Annihilation*, and so indeed it seems to be. For if God were to change his Mind never so much, lay aside his first Designs, and take as I may say new Measures, he could not well express or declare this outwardly by any more significant sign, than by bringing a Creature into Being, and for some time upholding him in it, and then depriving him of it again. And accordingly, when God was about by a general Flood to bring *Destruction* upon Man for his Wickedness, (which is less than *Annihilation*) 'tis said, that *it repented him that he had made him*, Gen. 6. 6.

9. To consider this matter then as distinctly as we can; if the Annihilation of a Creature imports any real Change in the Divine Will, it must be in one of these two senses, either in that he Positively wills that the Creature shall *not* be, or in that he ceases to will that he *shall* be. As to
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the former, there is no doubt but that *that* would be a real Change in the Will of God, or else there can never be any. For God will'd the Existence of the Creature, or else he could not have existed at all. And now to will that he should not exist, is to will quite contrary to what he did before. Here is Will and Will, and one is directly opposite to the other, which is the greatest Change that any Will is capable of. There is no doubt therefore but that this would imply a Change, if it were indeed so. But as that is Reason enough against it, so there is also no need of it. There is no need in order to the Annihilation of any Creature, that God should directly and positively Will that it should not Be, since considering the necessary and essential Dependence of the Creature upon God in Being, (acknowledg'd it seems even by those that contend for its Natural Immortality) his bare not willing or ceasing to will that it should be, would be sufficient. Some will go higher than this, affirming that the other way is *impossible*, as well as needless, and that 'tis not possible for God to annihilate any Creature, if it must be done in the way of a positive Will. For as the

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great Metaphysitian * observes, every positive Action (such as willing the Creature should not be certainly is) necessarily tends to some Being or other; and therefore if God should stand in need of such an Action for the Annihilation of Things, he could never annihilate them. And therefore that he may be able to do it, 'tis necessary he should be able to do it by an Abstraction of Action only. So that he esteems the other way, that of positive willing to be impossible, as tending to Being rather than not Being. In confirmation of which it may be farther observ'd, that for God to will that the Creature should not be, is the same as to will the not Being of the Creature, and whether not Being, or *non ens*, can be an Object capable of terminating the Divine Will, may deserve to be consider'd. But however this be, the very needlessness of this Hypothesis renders it impossible with respect to God, who as a most perfect Agent cannot possibly do any thing in vain, as 'tis certain he would do if he should employ a Positive Will for the Annihilation

* *Suarez Met. Tom. 1. Disput. 21. Sect. 1.*

of a Creature, when his bare ceasing to will its Existence would be alone sufficient for that purpose.

10. It is plain therefore, that the Annihilation of the Creature does not import any real Change in the Will of God, according to the first sense, *viz.* as implying any Positive Will in him that the Creature should not Be. Not that in that sense it would not be a real Change, but because in that sense it is not *true*; that being not an intelligible way of Annihilation, which neither requires, nor will admit of such a Positive Causation. Our way then is clear thus far; and therefore since Annihilation does not import any real Change in the Will of God in the sense of willing that the Creature should *not* be, if it imports any, it must be in the other sense, that of ceasing to will that it *should* be. Now here (contrary to what was observ'd in the former case) it must be acknowledged that this indeed is a true, and indeed only, conceivable sense of Annihilation, which according to the well known and generally receiv'd Doctrin of the Schools, is not a Positive, but a Privative Act. All the Question is, whether according to this sense it infers any Change or Innovation in the Divine Will. According to the

other sense of Annihilation there would have been a real Change ; but that sense is *not* the true sense of it. This on the contrary *is* the true sense, it not being intelligible how it should be any other way ; and therefore all that remains to be examin'd is, whether Annihilation, according to this sense or way of understanding it, imports any real *Change* in the Divine Will. This I apprehend to be the Point of the Difficulty.

II. In the *Creature* 'tis certain that the Change is as great in this way as in the other. For the Creature can but *not be*, and in not Being there is no latitude or degree of difference. And as to God, tho' in this way of stating the manner of Annihilation the Change in him may not be so great as in the other way, this being a Change of *Contradiction* only, whereas the other is a Change of *Contrariety*, between which two the Proportion seems to be the same as between not loving and hating ; yet how to avoid all Change here, will perhaps put our Philosophy pretty hard to it. For is not ceasing to will a Creature should be, as true, tho' not so great a Change from the first Will whereby it existed, as the willing it should *not* be ? God must have will'd the Existence
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of the Creature, or else it could never have been ; and is not then the ceasing from this willing (tho' he does not Positively Will the *contrary*) a true and real Change ? If it be not, how then comes the Creature to be *annihilated* ? For 'tis upon the Will of God that it intirely depends, as for Existence at first, so for its Continuance in it ; and if that Will be the same as it was, then the Creature should exist still, by the very same reason that it existed at first ; and if it be not the same, then is it not *alter'd* ? If God should begin to will what he did *not* will before, in *that* case there would, I suppose, be no doubt but that his Will would be changed. And is it not then as plain that he cannot leave off to will what he *did* will before without the like Change ? Now this seems to be the case in Annihilation. He before will'd that the Creature should exist, or else it would not have been at all, he now is supposed to *cease* from this Will that it should exist, or else it would be still ; and does he not, then cease to will the very thing that he before will'd, *viz.* the *Existence* of the Creature ; and consequently is not his Will changed, changed as much as it would be if he should begin to will the Existence of a Creature which he

he never will'd or thought of before? This latter is what all would allow to infer a Change in the Divine Will, and for that very reason would conclude it to be impossible; and why then they should not think the same of the other, may be sooner inquired than resolv'd. Besides after all, tho' God wills nothing necessarily but himself *Absolutely*, yet according to the Doctrine of * *Aquinas*, he is by reason of his Immutability so far a necessary Agent, even as to other things, as to will whatever he wills necessarily upon *Supposition*; that is, upon the Supposition of his having once will'd it. And if Necessarily, then Always; and if Always, then he can never unwill, or so much as cease from willing what he has once will'd. And consequently, since he has once will'd the Existence of the Creature, he can never cease from willing that the Creature should exist. If he does, then he ceases from willing what he has will'd, and therefore does not will it Necessarily, and therefore not Immutably. And so the Annihilation of the Creature seems to be plainly against the *Immutability* of God.

* Part 10. *Quæst.* 19. *Art.* 3. and 7.

12. And now perhaps I have tied the Knot too hard for my self to untie again. And indeed I know not but that many worse Arguments have been thought concluding, and so perhaps may this. But, Sir, to deal freely and ingenuously with you, (tho' it be a Concession in favour of your Cause) notwithstanding the plausible appearance it has of Truth, I am not satisfy'd that it is so. However he that will shew that it is not so, must, if I judge rightly, prove this Proposition (a pretty hard one, as one would think, to prove) That God in ceasing to will the Existence of the Creature (which yet is supposed to exist by his Will) does not truly and properly cease to will what he has will'd. For as to the Consequence of the Argument, viz. That if God should cease to will what he has will'd he would thereby undergo a Change in his Will, I think that is undeniably certain; since 'tis then plain that his Will has it self after another manner than it had before, which is all that we can understand by a *Change*. And therefore if we can hope to get off any where, it must be by disproving the minor Proposition, viz. That by ceasing to will the Existence of the Creature, he ceases to will what he will'd. This Proposition
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must be denied, and shewn to be false. But how can that possibly be, since 'tis by that very Will of his that the Creature is supposed to exist, and therefore in ceasing to will the Existence of the Creature he seems plainly to cease to will what he had will'd. So that the minor Proposition seems as evident and certain as the Consequence; and what then should hinder the Argument from Concluding?

13. Why truly, Sir, I can think but of one Expedient (if it be one) for the Solution of this Difficulty, and that is by so stating the Cessation of the Divine Will as to the Existence of the Creature supposed to be Annihilated, as to mean no more by God's ceasing to will that it should be, than that from all Eternity he will'd that it should be to such a precise Point or Instant of Time, and no longer. By *no longer* meaning not Positively, that he will'd it should no longer exist, (for then he would Positively Will not Being, the Thing rejected before) but Negatively, that he had no farther Will about it, as only willing it to such a Moment. And if then it ceases to exist, 'tis not because God ceases to will what he had will'd, but because he at first will'd no more. Well, but does not God really cease to will its Existence?

Existence? Yes, or else it would exist still. And did he not will its Existence? Yes, or else it would never have been. And does he not then plainly cease to will what he will'd? Upon this Supposition it may perhaps be answer'd, No. Because the proper and intire Object of God's Will is not the Existence of the Creature, but its Existence to such a certain Moment; and that Will is so far from being *unwill'd*, that 'tis the very Will that *obtains*, and has its Effect. The Creature *does* exist to the Moment supposed; and if it exists no farther, this shews indeed that his willing its Existence ceases, but not that he ceases to will what he will'd, because not its Existence precisely, but its Existence to *that Moment* was the Thing at first will'd by him. And accordingly that it exists no longer, may not be because his Will is *changed*, but because it is *fulfill'd*, the time for its duration being expired and run out, much after the same manner as it is in the Abrogation or Disannulment of the *Levitical* or Ceremonial Law. Of which very matter by the way I know not very well how to give a clear Account, but upon this or the like Supposition, whereby it may be so explain'd as not to intrench upon the *Immutability* of God. And so

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perhaps may Annihilation too ; at least this is the best Solution of the Matter that I know of. But whether it be a good one or no (wherein you who assert Annihilation in so many Cases, and the actual Annihilation of so many Souls, are more concern'd than my self) I leave to your more comprehensive Judgment to consider and determine.

14. But tho', Sir, your Supposition of Annihilation should make a hard shift to get off from the Objection of the Divine *Immutability* (an Objection which a great Philosopher thought so strong as to say, † *The Annihilation of Substances is a mark of Inconstancy in him that produced them, therefore they shall never cease*) yet there may perhaps be some other Considerations from which it will not so easily acquit it self. God in creating the least of his Creatures has imploy'd an Infinite Power. Now Wisdom requires that there ought to be a Proportion between the Work and the Action whereby it is produced. But now the Creature is intrinsically and by its Essence Finite. And therefore unless it be extrinsically and in respect of its Existence

† *Traité de la Nature Es de la Grace. Part 1. p. 4.*

Infinite, there will be no Proportion between the Work and the Power that produces it. And so it seems necessary that the Creature should have an *Infinite Existence*. But now this cannot be in the sense of *Eternity* (that being peculiar to him to whom Being is essential, and of whose very Essence it is to Be) and therefore if at all, it must be with respect to Perpetuity of *Duration*. And so as 'tis necessary that the Creature should *Begin*, (since otherwise it would not carry upon it the Character of its Dependence) so it seems as necessary that it should never *End*, and that tho' it cannot be *Eternal*, yet it should be *Everlasting*. And consequently that there should be no such thing as *Annihilation*. This is the First Thing I would offer to your Consideration.

15. Again it may be consider'd, that as no determinate Portion of Time bears any Proportion to Eternity, so neither does it to him that inhabits Eternity, nor appears as considerable in his esteem. Accordingly St. Peter tells us, *that a thousand years is to him as one day.* 2 Pet. 3. 8. And this he says in Answer to the Cavil of the Scoffers, who would fain know why Christ did so long delay his coming to Judgment, if he meant to come at all. To which he

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replies,

replies, by giving them to understand that they had not a right Notion of the length of this Delay, which ought not to be judged of according to Human Sense and Vulgar Apprehension. For God it seems does not measure Time as we do, nor reckon the Periods of it by our Kalendar. But a thousand Years, which seem a kind of an Eternity to us, are to him but as one Day. But the Psalmist goes a step higher, *Psal. 90.* telling us that a Thousand Years are in his sight but as *Yesterday*; and as *Yesterday* when 'tis *past*, and as a Watch in the Night. Expressions which bespeak a wonderful Grandeur and Majesty in God, and may serve to raise a very august and tremendous Idea of him in our Minds. He says also farther, that his own Age is as *Nothing* before him. Now methinks it does not seem a Thought worthy of God, or becoming either his Greatness or his Wisdom, to put a Creature into Being (tho' he were not to imploy an Infinite Power for that purpose, but much more if he *does*) for so little and inconsiderable a Time, as indeed all Time that has an End must needs be to *him*, and then to let it perish and return to Nothing again. Nor will it be any Answer here to say, that 'tis an easy matter for God to create ;

create ; and so neither the making nor the unmaking, or annihilating, his Creatures can cost him any thing, as being Omnipotent. For tho' this be true, yet it does not become Omnipotence, or him that has it to play and trifle, or to exert it self but upon great Occasions, and for extraordinary Purposes. And we see it does not, as in the Case of *Miracles*. Whether therefore it be worthy of Omnipotence to produce a Creature for a few Moments, and then to let it drop and vanish away for ever. Or whether this be not too much like the Play of Children, who raise Bubbles upon the Water only to have the Pleasure to see 'em sink again, and lose themselves in the fluid Surface? Only with this difference, that the transient Bubble seems worthy of the little trifling Action that produced it, whereas there seems no Proportion between the perishing Momentary Creature, and the Infinite Almighty Power whereby from not Being it was made to Be.

16. But besides again, as God has imploy'd an Infinite Power in giving Being to his Creatures, so also has he an equal *Wisdom*. *In Wisdom hast thou made them all.* Psal. 104. He consulted the Immutable Standards and Measures of all Perfection,

on, his own Eternal Ideas, when he made them, and by that Almighty Energy whereby he is able to subdue all things to himself, he wrought them up to a perfect conformity to those Ideas, so that they are all excellently Good and Perfect in their several Kinds; so very Good as to receive the solemn Approbation of him that made them. Besides, Things are *Relatively* as well as *Absolutely* Good; there being no Part of the Universe but what carries a Relation to the Whole, and contributes to set off the Order and Beauty of it. But now methinks when God has thus wisely form'd and settled a World of Creatures in such due Order and Beauty, it does not seem very agreeable either to *him* or *them*, that he should annihilate any part of it, especially since there is no part but what carries a Relation to the whole System; so that the destroying any part would be like taking away a String from a Musical Instrument, which can hardly be done without discomposing the Harmony. But tho' we could suppose it might, and that the Annihilation of any Creature would go no farther than that single Creature, yet it does not seem otherwise a fit or decorous Thought, that any of the Works of so Great and Wise an Artist should perish,
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but rather that they should always remain as everlasting Monuments of his Wisdom and Power. *Æternitati pingo*, you know who said it, and I fancy I know whom it may much better become.

17. For (to take a hint for another Consideration from the close of this last) it may deserve perhaps to be farther consider'd that God by annihilating any of his Creatures would lessen his own Honour and Glory; the very thing which is allow'd to be at least *part* of his aim in their Creation. For the Creatures, as they are the Effects of Infinite Wisdom and Power, so they carry the Marks and Characters of it upon them. Not only the Heavens declare the Glory of God, and the Firmament shews his handy-work, but the least blade of Grass that grows, or the poorest Insect that creeps upon the ground, tells us with an audible voice whose Work it is, and proclaims the Greatness of its Author. And accordingly the Apostle observes to us, *Rom. i.* that the invisible things of God from the Creation of the World (whether that signifies the *Means* by which, or the *Term* from whence, is all one to the present purpose) are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his Eternal Power and Godhead. The
Creatures

32 *A Letter to Mr. Dodwell concerning*

Creatures are it seems a sort of Scripture to the Pagan World, who may read the Perfections of God in the Book of Nature, and may take occasion from what they see, to praise and adore him that is *Invisible*. For the Creatures send us to God, and teach us how to glorify him, by the Praise which they themselves give to him. Accordingly the Psalmist tells us, *Psal. 145.* that *all God's Works do praise him.* And the greater that *All* is, and the more numerous the Creatures are, still the more Praise and Glory will redound to God from them. And therefore for him to annihilate any of them, would be to contract the Area of his own Theatre, and to lose so much of his Honour and Glory: Especially if he should do it in any considerable number, by annihilating all *Pagans*, all *unbaptized Infants*, and *Idcots*, according to the Tenour of that Hypothesis which you, Sir, are pleas'd to espouse. This would make a great *Mortality*, as I may say, in the Works of God, and would cause as great a Diminution of his Glory. Nor is it very obvious to see what can be replied here, unless it be that God, when he has annihilated so many of his Creatures, may easily make more in their stead. Which indeed is very true. But whether
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it will salve the matter may be reasonably doubted. For if you suppose him to make more to fill up the vacancy, it may be ask'd why he might not as well have continued the First. Unless you will suppose him to make Better, which besides the liberty of the Supposition, how it can be done is not very easy to be conceiv'd. Since they can but be conformable to their Ideas, and so they were before. Or if Better could be made, yet why were they not then made at the first, since then the same thing would be done by one Act which is now done by two. And God you know does nothing in vain.

18. But besides, not only the things themselves that are made, but even the very *Conservation* and *Government* of them tends to the Glory of God, and serves to the greater Illustration of his Wisdom and Power. But now Annihilation as 'tis contrary to Conservation, so it leaves no room or place for Government, as taking away the Subject of it. And therefore the Annihilation of any of his Creatures would rob and deprive God of so much of his Glory, as would otherwise redound to him from the Conservation and Government of those Creatures. Especially if the Creatures, supposed to undergo this Fate, be

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of such an Order as to be capable of rendering him any Honour or Glory by any proper Acts of their own, besides that *objective* way of glorifying him, as they shew forth his Greatness, and give other Beings an occasion of magnifying him for it. To annihilate such Creatures as these would be to retrench the Circle of his Grandeur, and to silence the Organs of his own Praise. And if it be said that Annihilation is as great a Demonstration of God's Power as Conservation is. Perhaps it may be so in one respect; not that Annihilation it self is properly an Act of *Power*, but that none can annihilate but God; and that because the Creature depends upon him only for Being. But then 'tis to be consider'd, that in Annihilation the Creature is for ever lost, and the Government of that Creature is lost, and all the Service which that Creature might do to God is lost, and all the Glory which it might bring to him is also lost, and that for one single transient Act of *Dominion* in exchange. For after all there is that farther Disparity in the Case. For Annihilation is only one single transient expression of Sovereignty and Power, and tho' a wonderful Scene of Contemplation for the present, yet when 'tis over, it leaves

leaves no remaining traces or footsteps behind it, and both the Creature reduced to nothing, and the Reduction it self will be forgotten, and buried in the same common Grave of Silence and Oblivion. Whereas in Conservation, besides the Glory that may arise from the Creatures conserv'd, the very *perpetuating Act* it self is a lasting and induring signification of God's Almighty Power, and stands like a Monument erected to his Glory.

19. But to carry this Matter a step or two farther yet. As God made all things according to their *Ideas*, so those *Ideas* were no other than *Himself*. For an *Idea* in God is not the Creature as * *objectively* existing in the Divine Mind, (according to the conceit of Mr. *Arnauld*) but the very *Essence* of God himself as imitable or participable by the Creature, and as truly representative of it. For indeed 'tis otherwise impossible that the Creature should have an Objective Being in the Mind of God, unless there were something in God that was really representative of the Creature; neither is it possible that God should have any Knowledge of the Creature be-

* See this at large discuss'd by *Vasquez*. Tom. 1. *Disput.*
71.

fore he made it, but by something representative of it in himself, there being then nothing existing but himself. Either then we must say that God did not foreknow what he was to make, or if he knew it, he knew it in himself, or by something in himself that was representative of it. So that the *Objective* Being of Things in God is so far from opposing or excluding, that it is founded upon and necessarily supposes their *Ideal* or *Intelligible* Being in his Essence, as really representative of them. The Ideas therefore of Things in God are not really different from his Essence. And since he made Things by these Ideas, therefore he made all Things according to himself; and accordingly tho' Man be said, in a more eminent and peculiar sense, to be made in the Image and after the Likeness of God, yet it may be truly said of the whole Creation, that it is in some measure ἀπεικόνισμα Θεῷ, and carries upon it an Impression or Signature of the Divine Being, according to that of *Plato* in his *Timæus*, Πάντα ὅτι υἰάματα ἐβελήθη γενέσθαι ἀεὶ ἀπλῆσια αὐτῷ. Now from hence it follows, That as God made all Things out of Love, so he must needs love all the Things that he has made. For as he infinitely loves himself, so he must in some degree love every thing that

that bears any resemblance of himself. And according to this says the Wise Man, *Thou lovest all the things that are, and abhorrest nothing which thou hast made. For never wouldst thou have made any thing, if thou hadst hated it.* Wisd. 11. 24. But now if God loves all Things that he has made, as carrying some resemblance of himself, it seems not very easy to conceive how *Annihilation* can stand with his Love, or how God can be said to love that Creature whom he annihilates. And that because Annihilation being a total Privation of Being, must take away the whole Object of that Love; and it seems not consistent with Love to destroy its own Object. On the contrary, to annihilate seems to be the signification of the greatest Hatred, even beyond that of making a Creature miserable. For that may be conceiv'd as done upon *Judicial* Considerations, and in compliance with the Rules of Order and Government; but to reduce a Being to Nothing, to cross him out of the List of the Creation, seems resolvible only into perfect *Abhorrence*. If it be said, that it may as well be resolv'd into *Pity* and *Mercy*, since God may be supposed to annihilate a Creature that he may put an end to his Misery, for the like reason as the Creature

ture may wish not Being to *himself*. To this I reply, That besides that it may be question'd whether not Being be not the greater Evil of the two, should it be granted to be the lesser Evil, yet the case of a Creature's willing not being to himself, and that of God's annihilating him are very different. That the Creature may in the Case supposed wish not to be, has no difficulty, because he has only to consider which is most for his Advantage. But God has other Rules to go by besides the Advantage of the Sinner. For in short, either he is bound in Justice to punish him or not. If not, then he may as well end his Misery by *not punishing*, as by *Annihilating*. And then there will be no occasion of the latter. But if he be bound in Justice to punish, then it will be as much against his *Punitive* Justice to annihilate him that ought to be punish'd, as it would be not to punish him. And so Annihilation finds no admittance this way; but if it gets in at all, it must be by the entrance of an *Abhorrence*. If it be ask'd, whether God may not abhor some Creatures to that degree; to this I answer, that no Creature can be the Object of God's *pure Abhorrence*, as still retaining some Good in him, whereby he resembles his Maker. God abhors
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nothing purely but *Sin*, and the Effect of that is to call for Punishment ; which is so far from favouring Annihilation, that it requires the *Existence* of the offending Creature. Which prevents an Objection ; for it may be said, that tho' the Creature cannot be the Object of God's *pure Hatred*, yet he may hate it more than he loves it ; and since 'tis the predominant side that carries it, Annihilation may consist with Love, tho' it cannot be the Effect of it as such. But to this I answer, That if God hates the Creature more than he loves it, it can only be on the account of *Sin* ; the consequence of which will be, that it will be necessary for him to *punish* him for that which he so hates. So that this Degree of Hatred may, for ought I know, as strongly infer the Existence of the Creature as even Love it self does. And if God loves the Creature as a Creature, and is concern'd to punish him as a Sinner, which way Annihilation can come in, I leave you to consider.

20. But setting aside the Consideration, that God necessarily loves the Works of his Hands, (which is natural for all Beings to do, especially when they find there any Similitude of themselves) yet the very impression which they carry of the Divine
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Perfections, and the Participation which they have of his Likeness may be pleaded in their behalf as an exemption from so strange a lot as that of *Annihilation*, it seeming not a congruity that any thing that bears a Resemblance of him that *necessarily is*, should ever cease to be. Now *that* all Creatures do, and must do one way or other, as was remark'd before, and that because they were made according to the Divine Ideas. They all therefore partake of the Divine Likeness, in their several degrees and measures; some as to Mind and Intellect, some as to Life, and all as to Being. Even Matter it self, which is the remotest Projection of the Divine Ideality, has its *intelligible counterpart* in the Divine Mind, and represents its spiritual Creator at least as to Being. But now it seems an uncooth and incongruous Thought to suppose that God should suffer any thing to perish, wherein he beholds any Semblance or Participation of himself. Especially if besides the actual Assimilation of the Creatures to the Ideas whereby they were made, and consequently to God who is really the same with those Ideas, it be farther supposed (which perhaps you will not think an unreasonable Supposition) that as God eternally contemplates himself

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in his Divine Word, his great and only just Idea ; or as the Author to the *Hebrews* expresses it, *the Brightness of his Glory, and the express Image of his Person* ; so in the Creation of the World he was willing to express his Perfections *ad extra*, and as far as might be to represent himself by something without himself. This seems fairly intimated in the Creation of Man ; and if it be so in other Things too according to their Proportion, as we may reasonably suppose, this I doubt would not suit very well with your Supposition of Annihilation, since Creatures, I will not say that are in themselves *perishable* (for that belongs to their Nature as *Creatures*, and can't be help'd) but that shall actually, and that in a little while too *perish*, and return to nothing, would make but an ordinary Representation of an Immortal, necessarily being, and Eternal God.

21. These Considerations are of much more force in the Intellectual part of the Creation, which by all Signs and Appearances seems made for Eternity. *Let us make Man*, was a great and a strange Consultation. And let us make him *in our Image, and after our Likeness*, was a much stranger. But that such a Consultation, and concerning such a Creature, should be

only for a while, and so little a while as the compass of Human Life, which at largest is but a *Span*, according to the stile of the Psalmist, and oftentimes not an Inch, would be much stranger than either. Let us make a *World*, or let us make Man, who is a little one, for Eternity, or for an everlasting Duration, is a Proposal not unworthy of the Divinity. But let us make such a Creature as Man, and in our Image too, for a few Moments (as we may well call the Life of Man in this World, since a thousand Years in God's account are but as *one Day*) and then to go off the Stage never to appear again, just as Astrologers make an *Almanack*, for a single Revolution, and then to be out of date; this seems a little too trifling for so solemn a Consultation, nor to become that Work whose Builder and Maker is God. Nor indeed does it seem worth while for Almighty God to imprint his own Image upon so flitting and momentary a Work. Nor truly does it appear the most conceivable thing in the World how such a short-dated Creature, such an *Almanack-kind* of Being, can be said to be made in the Image, and after the Likeness of God, the principal part of whose Image is his Eternity, and Immutability. Besides after all, God

as in all his Works, so more especially in the Creation of Man, must be supposed to have proposed a considerable End, an End worthy of himself, and worthy of him, and also worthy of the Infinite Power and Wisdom which he imploy'd in the creating him : And indeed an everlasting Duration may answer to all this. But if his Duration be so short, so as to determine with this mortal Life, or a little after (which, Sir, according to your own Hypothesis, will be the Case of those Pagans whose lot is to live about the conclusion of this Scene) what End he should then serve to that is worthy of him that made him, or even of the very Action whereby he was produced, is not mighty easy to conceive.

22. I expect, Sir, you should here interrupt me, that according to your Hypothesis not the *whole Body* of Mankind is to be annihilated, but only the *Pagan* part of it, &c. (those who have had the Gospel preach'd to 'em, tho' naturally as Mortal as the other, being to be *Immortalized*) and that even the Souls of these Pagans are not to be annihilated immediately upon their leaving their Bodies (tho' I should think that the properest time, if ever) but at the End of the World. But however

those of them upon whom that great Horizon of Nature falls, will, as I observ'd before, be annihilated immediately upon their *Death*, and as to many of them, those I mean who shall dye in their Infancy, immediately or not long after they began to *live*. And can you suppose it worthy of God, or worth his while to create so many Creatures, by an Almighty Power, and to imprint his own Image upon them by as infinite a Goodness for so transitory and vanishing a Duration? Are not such *mushrom* Creatures too much like those *Bubbles* upon the Water we were before speaking of, and whether the Action that produces them would not be almost as trifling, may deserve to be consider'd. And if the mere Decease of Infants so suddenly upon their Birth, as if they came into the World only to go out again, has been thought such a Difficulty, how much more dark and amusing must the Difficulty be, if so soon upon their entrance into the World they not only *Dye*, but expire into *Nothing*. Mr. *Clark* it seems has a Stricture upon the Case of these late living Heathens, but that's to another purpose, *viz.* that of Rewards and Punishments, how they may be applied to them who live at the End of the World, and
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are then to be annihilated. To which your Answer of supplying for the Duration of these Rewards and Punishments by the Intenfeness of the Degrees of them, may for ought I know (tho' it seems a pretty free Supposition) be of some force, so far as to make their Case equal in that respect with those that liv'd and deceas'd at a greater Distance. But this Answer will not serve here, where I am considering not the room which so short a Duration allows for Rewards or Punishments, but the Moment, the Importance, the Congruity of God's creating so many Rational Souls for so short a time, and (as to those who then dye Infants) that must be annihilated almost as soon as they are made. This seems to have a great Incongruity in it; and as for those Heathens that live in the earlier Ages of the World, tho' they have hereby a larger *Reprieve*, yet since they are to be annihilated at the end of it, and a Thousand Years in God's esteem are but as One Day, these also seem to have been created for no great Purpose. Besides, the Time assigned for the Annihilation of these Pagan Souls, *viz.* the *Conflagration*, seems not to be without its Difficulty. For besides, that no certain Time can be well fix'd for that which intirely depends upon
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the Will of God, without a particular Revelation from him, why should Souls who in a little time are to be Nothing, be preserv'd in a separate State so long, and not rather be annihilated immediately upon their disunion from the Body? The Conflagration can do nothing towards Annihilation by way of Natural Causality. And if you will have them reprieved till then for the sake of Rewards and Punishments, besides that this may be done at any other time as well as then, it may be question'd whether it be worth while to be so strict upon poor Souls that are so shortly to return to Nothing, especially as to the *Penal* part, Annihilation it self being a very great, some will say the greatest of all Punishments. Or if God shall think them worth rewarding or punishing, why then not as well worth *preserving*? And the rather, that they may remain as Monuments of his Justice and Goodness; the Illustration of which is one great End for which he may be supposed either to reward, or punish.

23. But as to the Annihilation of the Pagan part of the World *absolutely* consider'd in it self, and without relation to Time or Circumstance. This, Sir, by the way makes very short work with the great
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Question concerning the *Salvation* of *Heathens*, by taking away the very Subject which the Question supposes, and upon which it proceeds. But that which I would more directly observe to the present purpose is in the first place, that the striking off so vast a number of Human Souls, as the whole Pagan World, with many others which you are pleas'd to put upon the same *File*, from the List of the Creation, would make a strange Havock, I had almost said *Desolation*, among the Works of God. It would be a kind of a *Massacre* in the Intellectual World, for which it would be hard to give any good Account. You cannot say it is for *Sin*, for *that* God must needs foreknow when he made them; and if that were to be a Reason why they should be annihilated, methinks it should have been as good if not a better Reason, that they should never have been made. Besides, the Scripture does no where threaten Annihilation for Sin, but everlasting Misery; which supposes the like Duration. And besides, you your self are so far from making Annihilation the Punishment of Sin, that you suppose Christian Infidels and Impenitent Sinners to be Immortaliz'd for Punishment. And if it be not for Sin that so many Myriads of Souls are to be reduced

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reduced to Nothing, 'tis hard to imagin what it should be for else ; and sure it is too great a *Catastrophe* to be resolv'd into pure *Arbitrary* Will and Pleasure. These Souls were it seems worth *making*, and one would think they should be as well worth *preserving* too ; and if ever *Number* should defend, one would expect it should be here. *Shall I destroy Nineveh that great City ?*

24. Besides, Sir, you may please to consider, that if all the *Pagan* World, with the rest which you involve with them in the same Fate, are to be annihilated, then according to your Scheme, a great part of Mankind, I might say (considering the *Lateness* of *Christianity*, and how little proportion *Christendom* now bears to the rest of the World) by far the *greatest*, would have no such thing as Immortal Souls in any sense or respect whatsoever, but would be in the same Form with the Beasts that perish. For all Immortality is either *Natural* or *Positive* ; and Natural is either as to *Incorruption*, or as to *Being* or simple Subsistence. Now as to Natural Immortality in the sense of *Incorruptibility*, that according to you they have not, because you allow no such thing to belong to the Soul. And as to the other Natural Im-

Immortality which relates to *Being*, that they *can't possibly* have, because no Creature is capable of that Immortality, which according to you (and me too) is peculiar to God. So then here is no Natural Immortality for them. All the dependance then which these poor Souls can have must be upon that part of Immortality which is *Positive*, the *reserve* of actual Subsistence. And if they are cut off from that too, as 'tis plain that by your Supposition of Annihilation they are, then they are cut off from all; and so here is an innumerable number of Human Souls made in the Image, and after the Likeness of God, which have no Immortality at all in any manner of sense belonging to them, but must inherit Emptiness and Oblivion, and (only with the small difference of a little longer interval) must depart and Dye like the Beasts that perish.

25. And would not this be enough to make them *live* like them too, if it were known to them? You say indeed that you do not allow the Benefit of Actual Mortality to any that shall *see your Book*, or, who can therefore be supposed capable of receiving any pernicious Errour by it. Because, none can see it but they who know the *Gospel*, (I suppose you mean because

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they will know the Gospel *by* seeing it) and such are not by your Principles concern'd in this Annihilation, but must look for a Blessed or a Miserable Immortality. Here, Sir, to pass over what to some perhaps would seem a little strange, that the seeing your Book should intitle a Man to *Immortality*, I observe first, that tho' any of these Pagans, that had a sight of your Book, might receive no Prejudice as to their Morals from it, because with the sight of your Book they would at the same time know the Gospel too, and so would be no longer those Persons to whom the *Priviledge* of *Annihilation* belongs; yet all this is only by Accident, not from the Nature of the Doctrin it self, but because other things are mixed with it relating to Christianity, which to *them* would hinder the *Application* of it. But this is nothing to the Doctrin; nor does it any more prove it to be innocent, than *Aqua Fortis* would be proved not to be Poyson, because given in a *Vehicle* that is an *Antidote*. However the Nature of the thing is not changed, tho' the Effect of it be for that time over-ruled. And so the Doctrin is the same still in its own Natural Tendency, which I think must needs be to make all those who are concern'd in it less solici-

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tous how they live, since Annihilation is to be their lot. *Let us Eat and Drink, for to Morrow we Dye.* But secondly, Suppose any Pagan should come to the Knowledge of this *Beneficial* Doctrin some *other* way than by the sight of your Book, as by the Workings of his own Thoughts, or by the Representation of some others, who may impart this comfortable Doctrin to him by it self, without mentioning what you say besides, relating to Christianity, that might unqualify him for having a concern in it, what then? Would not this Doctrin then effectually tend to corrupt the Morals of this Pagan, so far as he believ'd it? I think there can be no doubt of it, unless you will suppose him to want so much Logic as to make the natural and proper Inference from such a Principle.

26. The Concern and Expectation of a Future World, and of an after *Immortality*, is not only a great Incouragement to well Living, but the only competent security of a vertuous Life; without which there can be no sufficient Ingagement to determin a Man to undertake it, or to carry him through all the Difficulties of it. And no doubt but that this was the very Consideration that had such Influence upon the Heathens in the Government of

their Passions, and the Conduct of their Lives. For tho' by their dark Light and uncertain Reasonings they could never arrive to so full an Assurance, and so reposed a Satisfaction concerning an Immortal State as we have, to whom Life and Immortality is brought to light by the Gospel, yet 'tis plain that they did in great measure believe and expect it, and entertain themselves with it as a reasonable Hope. Their Poets had a great many Fictions, and their Philosophers many serious and rational Discourses about it. And 'twas this Prospect (as obscure and glimmering as it was) that help'd to smoothen to them the rugged way of Vertue, and inspirited them with Vigour to walk in it so chearfully as many of them did. And had it not been for this, notwithstanding the Charms of Prudence or

* *In Phædro.* Vertue, which as * *Plato* says, and *Cicero* from him, would excite such Ravishments of Love if it were seen, and notwithstanding their Boasts of *Vertue's being its own Reward*, 'tis very much to be question'd, whether they would have left behind them such eminent Achievements in Vertue as they have done. But were they positively assured that there was no After-state to be expected, or if there was, that

that *they* however were to have no share in it, or at most that after a little interval *Annihilation* was to be their final Portion, they would no doubt have flagg'd in their virtuous Resolutions, and have indulg'd themselves in the Liberties of a sensual Life. We see how difficult it is to keep up to the Rules and Duties of Vertue when *with* the Prospect of Immortality before us, much more *without* it.

27. And indeed I know not but that this Doctrin of Annihilation may be of ill Consequence to Christians, as well as Pagans. For tho' according to the *Proposition* of your System, all those who know the Gospel (tho' naturally as Mortal as other Men) have an actual Immortality to look for, of one kind or other, being to be Immortaliz'd either to Reward or Punishment, yet I, who am one of those, cannot so readily upon your Principles apply this to my self. For I cannot be assured of my own Actual Immortality, but either upon a Principle of *Reason*, or a Principle of *Faith*. Arguments from *Reason* to prove my Actual Immortality as to *Being*, upon your Supposition, I can have *none*. I don't mean that are Demonstrative (for that of this matter I cannot have upon *any* Supposition) but none at all

all that have any perſwaſive Force, or are any ways concluding. Becauſe if there be any ſuch, they muſt be *general* ones, and ſuch as conclude (as far as they go) *univerſally*, and of all Men alike. But now if your Notion be admitted, *that* cannot be; becauſe according to that the far greateſt part of Mankind are to be annihilated. And if ſo, then here is no room for any *univerſal* Argument, there being ſo many particular Inſtances of Fact ſuppoſed to the contrary; and conſequently, as far as pure Reaſon is concern'd, there can be no arguing to any purpoſe at all. And this by the way, Sir, may be conſider'd as another diſtinct Exception againſt your Suppoſition of the Annihilation of the Pagan World, becauſe by it we can have no Satisfaction of our own Immortality in a *Rational* way.

28. But perhaps we may be better aſſured of this upon Principles of *Faith*. And indeed there is no doubt but Absolutely ſpeaking, we *may*; or elſe Life and Immortality could not be ſaid to be brought to Light by the Goſpel. But whether we may upon *your* Principles, is a Queſtion. For here again as in the other Caſe, ſince God has made me no Particular Revelation of my own Immortality, I can have no
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reason from Scripture to believe my self to be actually Immortal as to Being, but only upon the account of certain *general Propositions* which I find there relating to the Immortality of *all Men*. And such general Propositions indeed there are many, and such as I should be otherwise satisfy'd with. But I am told by a very great Man, that all *Pagans, unbaptized Infants, and Natural Idiots* are to be left to their Natural Mortality, and so annihilated. The Individuals contain'd under these sorts amount to a vast number ; and how do I know since there is such a thing as *Annihilation*, and that in such numerous Instances, but that there may be some other *secret Exceptions* which I know nothing of. For that the other are *secret Exceptions* I think cannot be denied, since the Scripture takes no notice, nor makes any mention of them ; and admitting these, how do I know but that there may be *more*. Had these Exceptions been made in *Scripture*, by saying that all Men are Immortal except *Pagans, &c.* the Case of the unexcepted would have been clear, and the clearer for the Exception. Or had the Proposition of the Scripture been this, that *Christians only* are to be Immortal, the Annihilation of Pagans would have been no Exception to that

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that Proposition, as not falling under, and so not retrenching the extent of it. But since the Immortality reveal'd in Scripture is deliver'd in general and indefinite terms, without either limiting this Immortality to Christians, or excluding Pagans from it, as to exclude them is an Exception, so 'tis a *secret* Exception, that is an Exception not express'd in the *Rule*; and if once a liberty be admitted of making such Exceptions, how do I know but that there may be more still behind, and particularly but that the *Socinian* Exception, concerning the Annihilation of *wicked* Men may take place as well as any of the rest. And how shall I depend upon this general Rule, or indeed how can I look upon it as *such*, since at this rate of interpreting it, the *Exceptions* will be more than the *Rule*. And who shall secure me in such a numerous Desolation, when I see a thousand fall besides me, and ten thousand at my right hand, that it shall not come nigh my Dwelling. And the more Humble I am, that is, the better *Christian* I am, and the more meanly I think of my self, the more apt I shall be to fall into this Temptation. And that notwithstanding the general Propositions of Scripture. For if notwithstanding these some have been led to conclude

clude from the Goodness of God, that there shall be an End of those *Sufferings* which the Scripture declares Everlasting; much more may I be induced to think (as much *Christian* as I am) that there may be an End of my *Being* some time or other by Annihilation, because I have here an Example before me of so many Creatures of the same Nature, and perhaps otherwise much better than my self, whose actual lot this is to be. The Concern of lesser Calamities may reach no farther than the Hurt which they inflict, or the Change which they make; but *Annihilation*, like an *Earthquake*, shakes the very ground under one, and alarms the whole Neighbourhood. And thus the Annihilation of the Heathen World may threaten disturbance to the *Christian*, and they that know the Gospel may, notwithstanding the general declarations of it, be tempted upon the Supposition of so many *By Exceptions* to hope or fear their own Annihilation, according as their Interests incline them to the one or to the other.

29. Then as to the supposable alleviation of the inconvenience that attends this Doctrine of Annihilation, *viz.* that only the Pagan part of the World, &c. are concern'd in it. This if it may be supposed

to qualify the Harshness of the Notion one way, it certainly makes it much worse another, as arguing a great *inequality* and *disuniformity* in the Divine Conduct, by making so vast a difference in Creatures of the same Rank, Order, and Nature, and upon whom his own Image is equally stamp'd. Should God annihilate all Mankind and preserve the *Angels*, or should he annihilate all Brutes and preserve *Man*, or should he annihilate the whole vegetable World and preserve what we call the *sensitive*, this tho' exceeding strange, and otherwise against all rational Presumption, that God should destroy so many of his own Works, in the making of which he declared himself so well satisfy'd, would yet however carry some appearance of equality, and be a more uniform way of proceeding. But to make so vast a difference in Creatures of the same kind, as to preserve some in Being, and annihilate others, and those the far greater part too, this carries something in it of so odd a Figure, that one knows not how to make it lye easy upon ones Thoughts, and is perhaps a more absurd and unaccountable supposition in it self consider'd, than that God should annihilate the whole Body of Mankind. I say in it *self* consider'd, because

cause indeed if you take in the *Redemption* of the World by *Christ*, the Annihilation of the whole species might be of worser Consequence, as intirely frustrating the End of that great Undertaking. But setting that one extrinsic Consideration aside, and comparing the things as they are absolutely in themselves, I don't know but that every way else such a *Partial* would imply more strangeness and unreasonableness in it than a *total* Annihilation.

30. But however this be as to the *comparative* part, which I have no occasion to be very strict upon, yet *this* may be consider'd as another absolute Argument against any such Supposition, that it has so much inequality and disuniformity in it. For it seems not at all reasonable to suppose, that God who loves Order and Regularity, and who is pleas'd to appeal even to Human Judgment concerning the equality of his ways, should deal so unequally with Creatures whom he has made naturally equal, and placed in the same *Form of Being*. For that all Human Souls are equal as to their *Specific Reason*, whereof they all equally partake, is allow'd in Philosophy. All that can be properly disputed is, (which I take to be the true state of the Question of the *Natural Equality*

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lity of Souls) whether they are all equally perfect as to their *Individual Differences*. And tho' I see no occasion even here of supposing any such Natural Inequality, since there is no apparent diversity of Souls but what may easily be resolv'd into the different Disposition of the Body, and we are not to multiply Differences in Being any more than Beings themselves without necessity, yet if we should suppose that there was any such Natural Difference or Inequality between them, this however I think is clear, that we have no reason to throw that Inequality all on *one side*, that is, that of the *Heathens*. That would be a strange Inequality indeed, for which I think no good Reason can be given but Partiality and Self love, and a willingness to subject all People to our selves. I am sure the Performances which the Heathen have left (which are the best measures of their Abilities) will give us no just occasion to think their Intellectual Endowments so much inferiour to our own. For considering them absolutely as *Writers*, and not as Writers of such an *Age*, and concerning such particular *Matters*, (in which respect the *Fathers of the Church* have undoubtedly the Advantage) I cannot but think the Pagan Memorials to be the most
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considerable part of Antiquity. At least we have no reason to undervalue them, since we place so much of our Learning in the Knowledge of their Writings, the only part of them it seems that is *Immortal*.

31. But why, Sir, should not the Heathen be concern'd with the rest of Mankind in the *Future Judgment*? And that not only as to what you call the *retrospective* part, that which concerns the adjustments of some inequalities of this Life, those of Calamitous Vertue, or Prosperous Vice, but even in the *final* Sentences of that Judgment, with all the Consequences that are to follow upon it. For are they not Rational Creatures? Have they not a Principle of Reason to know Good from Evil? And have they not Liberty of Will to avoid the one, and to chuse the other? And have they not by the help of both a free Government of their Actions? And have they not also a Rule to direct and regulate their Actions by? even the *Law written in their Hearts*, which the Apostle speaks of, *Rom. 2. 15*. And to what purpose was it written there, if they are not to be *judged* by it? And have they not Consciences within them accusing or excusing, approving or condemning them according as their Actions agree or disagree

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agree to this internal Rule ? Yes, the Apostle tells us in the same place that they have ; to which I further add, and have they not also Natural *Presages* of Conscience, as well as the *directive* Dictates of it, prompting and admonishing them to expect an Account that they must give, and a Retribution that they shall receive for what they have done ? Else what means all that part of the Heathen *Mythology* relating to the Rewards and Punishments of the other World ? In a word, are they not every way *Accountable* Creatures, in all respects fitly qualified to be brought into Judgment, and to stand before the Tribunal Seat of Christ ? And why then should they not be equally concern'd in the great and general Assize with other Men ? 'Tis true indeed they are under some singular Disadvantages for want of the *Discoveries* and the *Incouragements* of the Gospel, having neither so clear a Light to walk by, nor yet so perswading Motives to follow it, as we Christians have. And so it cannot, and without doubt *will* not be expected, that their Proficiency in Goodness and Vertue should be so great. But what then ? This is no Reason that they shall not be judg'd, nay and have an equal Concern in the Judicial Process

Process and Sentence of the last Day, but only that they shall not be judg'd by the same measure that Christians are to be judg'd by, but by some other, more proportion'd to the Disadvantages of their Condition. As the Apostle also plainly intimates to us that they shall, when he tells us, that *as many as have sin'd without Law, shall also perish without Law : And that as many as have sin'd in the Law shall be judg'd by the Law*, Rom. 2. 12. Where the Apostle's assigning a different and peculiar measure of God's Procedure in his taking an Account of the Heathen World who had no reveal'd Law, but only the Law of Nature, is so far from exempting them from having a Part in the General Judgment, and all the Consequences of it, that it more strongly and emphatically confirms their being concern'd in both. And that no advantage can here be taken of the words *ἀπολεῖν* and *κτείνουσιν*, as if the former being opposed to the latter, and applied to the Heathens, should imply their *Annihilation*, or ceasing to be, might easily be shewn from the frequent Application of that word in the New Testament to such whose *perishing* can be meant only of their being *miserable*, but that

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that a Learned * Adversary of yours has saved me the labour, to whose critical Account of which words I refer you for full Satisfaction, as also I do for a full *Scriptural* Proof of the Heathens being concern'd in the Future Judgment, which you will also find in the same place.

32. I shall here farther remark, That the Final Judgment is express'd in Scripture by terms every whit as extensive and universal as *Death* it self is, without any limitation or exception either as to Nation, Age, Sect or Quality. And as where God has made no exception, I know no warrant we can have to make any ; so if we do, by the same reason that we may make some or any, we may take the liberty to make more, and so the general Declarations which God has made concerning this great Revolution, and last Scene of his Providence, will be render'd insignificant, and the very Faith of the Article it self will be indanger'd ; or if Men should make a shift to believe such a thing at large as a Judgment to come, yet as by these Exceptions no Man could be very

* Dr. *Whitby* in his *Reflections* on *Some Assertions and Opinions of Mr. Dodwell*, p. 65.

sure of being *Personally* concern'd in it, so every Man would be apt, or at least have a fair Temptation to exempt his own *dear* self from it. And so the General Judgment would lose much of that effect for which it was reveal'd, which yet is the great Moral Instrument for securing the due Government of Human Life, and keeping good Order in the World. This as to the *Heathen* part of it would wholly be lost, who by this Doctrin could have no restraint upon their Actions from any Future Account which they were to give of them. And 'tis obvious to imagin how vicious those Heathens would have been whom the *deceitful* Presages of the contrary kept in awe, if this Favourable Doctrin of their being unconcern'd in the common Judgment of the World, had been known to them. And 'tis well if those *Christians* to whom it *is* known, do not make an ill use of it.

33. But that they may not, I shall add one Consideration more upon this Part, which is, That as in the general Declarations concerning the Final Judgment God has excepted *none*, so he has particularly and expressly mention'd *some*. And as we have *no* reason to exclude those whom God has not excepted, so we have a great

deal of *positive* Reason not to except those whom he has taken special care (as it were by way of *Prevention*) particularly to mention. Now of this very number the Heathen part of the World happens to be one. For besides the place last mention'd concerning those who have sin'd without Law, which is a plain designation of the Heathens, and besides what St. *Peter* says expressly of those Gentiles who would fain have Christians as debauch'd as themselves, 1 *Pet.* 4. 5. that they shall give account to him that is ready to judge the Quick and the Dead; and besides the Vengeance which St. *Paul* says will be taken, 2 *Thess.* 1. 8. when the Lord Jesus shall be reveal'd from Heaven, upon those who know not God, as well as upon those that obey not the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ; as much as to say upon *Heathens* as well as upon *Christians*, whereof these seem to be plain and distinct Characters. And besides again, what our Saviour says of *Sodom* and *Gomorrhah*, and *Tyre* and *Sidon*, that their Condition should be more tolerable at the Day of Judgment (which certainly must imply their having a part in it) than some of those Infidel and Impenitent Cities where he had preach'd and wrought his Miracles; I say, besides these places which

which seem all apposite enough to the purpose, I would more especially commend those words of *St. Paul* to your Consideration, *Rom. 2. 9.* where he says, that *Tribulation and Wrath shall be to every Soul of Man that works evil, to the Jew first, and also to the Gentile. But Glory, Honour and Peace to every Man that works good, to the Jew first, and also to the Gentile, or Greek,* as it is in the Original. Which words taken with their coherence both before and after, from verse the 4th to verse the 17th, whereby they are necessarily refer'd to the Day of Judgment, are so full and plain for interesting the Hea-then World in that Judgment, that I need not farther descant upon them; especially being prevented by the Observations which the Learned Author last mention'd has already made upon them, as he has also done upon the other places by me here alledg'd. I shall therefore only farther note, that the *Jew* and *Gentile* are here placed together upon a common level in the Final Distribution of Rewards and Punishments, with this only difference, that the *Jew* was the principal of the two, and that a severer account was to be exacted from him, as having a more perfect Knowledge of the Will of God by the *Law*,

than the other could be supposed to have by the *Light of Nature*, according to that of our Saviour, *the Servant that knows his Master's Will*, &c. But then this plainly implies (and indeed more plainly than if such a difference had never been made) that tho' they are to expect a different *measure* of Retribution in the Final Judgment, yet they are both equally concern'd in the *thing*. So that if we except the *Gentile* from it, we may as well except the *Jew* too, and (unless we have a strong fancy to stop there) the *Christian* also, and then believe a Day of Judgment if we can, when there are none to be *judged*.

34. But, Sir, to return once more to your Supposition of Annihilation *absolutely* consider'd, whether of Heathens, or of any Body else. It seems in my Opinion, to be another considerable Argument against it, that God has implanted in Man a Natural Desire of Immortality, or to speak more properly, of Everlasting Existence. The Love of Eternity is as natural to Man as the love of *Happiness*; and as all Men naturally desire to be *happy*, so they all as naturally desire for ever to *be*, that so they may be for ever happy. The Desire of Being is as natural as the Desire of Well-being, and can no more be put off from

us, or extinguish'd in us, than the other can. What an extream and prevailing sense of Misery may do as to a free and actual choice of not Being before being in Misery, I shall not dispute. Perhaps it may be so, tho' St. *Austin* * you know is positive for the other side of the Question, that 'tis better and more eligible to be miserable than not to be at all. But however supposing it should be otherwise, as indeed notwithstanding the Authority of St. *Austin* I am more inclinable to think it is, yet to this I have two things to say. 1. That tho' in the Case supposed the Man should upon the whole actually will not to Be with a *love* of *choice*, yet he would still retain his *Natural Love*, or Love of *Inclination*, to Being, in the same sense and manner as a Man retains his natural love for Life, when yet he actually chuses Death rather than commit a Sin, as in the Case of *Martyrdom*. 2. That even when not Being is chosen, 'tis not for it self, but only as a means to avoid the other, as the greater Evil of the two. In it self it is every ones natural Abhorrence, and to Be is what every Man naturally

* De lib. Arbitrio, lib. 3. c. 7, 8.

loves and desires, as naturally as he does to *live*. And indeed a great deal more. For to live is only a certain limited manner of Being, and that not the most perfect neither as *Animally* consider'd. And therefore if we so naturally love Life, which is but a little narrow thing in comparison of Being, much more must we be inclined to love Being at large, which comprehends so many degrees under it. And in the same proportion our Aversion to *Annihilation* must be much greater than that which we naturally have to *Death*. This desire of having our Being perpetuated implanted by God in our Nature, is I think commonly used as an Argument to prove the *Immortality* of the Soul *Absolutely*. But perhaps it might be better with a Limitation. For I think 'tis plain, that it cannot prove the *Natural* Immortality of the Soul, not in any degree of Proof, nor in any sense of Immortality. Not as to *Being*, because the Soul has no such Immortality as *that* belonging to its Nature, as is shewn in the Philosophical Discourse. Nor yet as to *Incorruptibility*; for tho' the Soul be in this sense naturally Immortal, as is there also observ'd, yet this is not to be prov'd by any Act or *Impression* of God upon it, nor indeed by any thing from without, but
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from the very Nature of the Soul it self, viz. from its *Spirituality*, whereof this sort of Immortality is a Natural Property. But however as to a *positive* actual Immortality, or to speak more properly Everlastingness of Existence, or Perpetuity of Being, in opposition to actual Annihilation, that indeed it seems to be a considerable Argument of, it being not to be supposed that God who does nothing in vain, should implant such a Desire of *Self-perpetuation*, or Everlasting Existence in a Creature which he made only for a Time, or which in a little time (as all Time is little to *him*) he means to *annihilate*.

35. But *why* after all should we suppose that God should annihilate any thing that he has made ? We want a good reason why God *should* annihilate, but indeed properly speaking we want none that he should *not* ; because this is but going on in the course that is begun, and that by his own Will, in part declared by the very constitution of things. Whereas Annihilation is a thing wholly extraordinary and out of course, and therefore not to be supposed without a very good reason. And yet it so happens, that where there is least Reason wanted, there we have most, and where there is most wanted there we have least.

least. There is a great deal of reason why God should *not* annihilate ; but 'tis not easy to find one reason why he *should*. Indeed one may justly expect a much better reason *for* Annihilation than *against* it. For we that are against it are in *Possession*, and to turn us out of it, a Better Title than our own had need be produced. God's having put his Creatures in Being, is so far a *practical* signification of his Will that they should Be, and therefore till that Will be revers'd by a more certain sign, we have good reason to presume that he still perseveres to will their Existence. And therefore tho' there were no reason to be given against Annihilation, yet if there be no plain reason for it, that alone as the Case stands is reason enough against it. 'Tis not so on the other side. Were there no reason that God should *not* annihilate his Creatures, that cannot be pleaded as a reason to suppose that he will. No, a Positive Reason is here requir'd, because Being, and God's Will for it (without which nothing can be) is what we are in Possession of ; and therefore a meer Negative cannot dispossess us of our Positive and Actual Tenure. But now on this side the Case is otherwise. Here, there being no assignable Reason that God will annihilate, is of it
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self a good Reason that he will not. At least we have good Reason so to presume, because where no better Reason appears to the contrary, Possession is a Reason.

36. If any thing could be a Reason why God should annihilate any of his Creatures (and to be sure he can no more annihilate than *create* without Reason) methinks it should be *Sin*, there being nothing so opposite to his own Nature, nor so much against the End for which the Creature was brought into Being, as that. But in opposition to this it may be consider'd in the first place; that even Sin it self, as great a Disorder and Deformity as it is in its own Nature, comes yet under the Order of God's wise Disposal, and within the Circle of his Providential System, and does in some sense contribute to the Perfection of the Divine Government, by setting forth, I will not say the Beauty of the Universe, (for that needs no *such* Foils) but the excellent Conduct of its Author in bringing Good out of Evil, and so turning even the Folly of Sin to the Glory of his Wisdom. Or else indeed I think there is no account to be given why he should permit it, if (as evil as it is) it were not in some respect good that it should be. And according to this is the

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Doctrin of St. *Austin* †, when he tells us, that God who is Omnipotent and most Good, would by no means suffer Evil to be, if he were not so Omnipotent withal, and so Good as to do Good out of Evil. Which implies, that upon the whole it is better to suffer Evil than to hinder it. And accordingly says he again *, speaking of the Angels, *Who when he foreknew that some of the Angels would be Deserters of so great a Good by Pride, whereby they would gain suffice to themselves for Happiness, he did not take away this Power from them, as thinking it more Powerful and Better to do Good even from out of Evil, than not to suffer Evil to be.* So that there is no sufficient Reason why God should annihilate his Creatures for that which he knows how to make so great an Advantage of, as appears in the Redemption of the World by Jesus Christ, occasion'd by *Adam's* Fall. For as great an Evil as Sin is, I think there can be no doubt but that the Sacrifice of the Incarnate Word turn'd more to God's Glory, than the Rebellion of *Adam* did to his Dishonour. Again in the second place, 'Tis most certain that God *foreknew*

† *Enchirid. ad Laurentium, cap. 11.*

* *De Cie. Dei, l. 22. c. 1.*

what Sins his Creatures would commit before he made them, and yet he thought fit, it seems, to make them even with that View; and therefore the Consideration of those Sins can be no Reason why he should annihilate them; or if it be, methinks it should be a much better Reason why he should not have made them at all. Again thirdly, If God should annihilate any of his Creatures for *Sin*, why does he not annihilate the *Devil*, the first and the worst of Sinners, and the great Promoter of all Sin and Wickedness? But that I suppose you will not say, nor will the Scripture permit you, where the *Everlasting Fire* prepared for the Devil, must necessarily suppose the Devil to be *Everlasting* too. Besides, to argue a little upon your own Grounds, If Sin be a Reason for Annihilation, why should not God annihilate a *wicked Christian* as well as a *Heathen*? For 'tis certain, that a wicked Christian is much worse than a wicked, much more, than a *good* vertuous Heathen. But you who are for the Annihilation of the latter, will not allow the former to be capable of that Benefit. And consequently you, even upon your own Principles, cannot admit *Sin* to be a Reason of Annihilation. Besides in the last place, We don't find that the

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Scripture threatens *Annihilation* as the Punishment of Sin, but rather such Sufferings as would make that desirable. And if *Sin* cannot be a Reason of Annihilation, for what Reason else God should annihilate any of his Creatures is hard to conceive, and that he should annihilate them without any Reason at all, would be much more inconceivable.

37. To all which it may be added, that we have no *Instance* of Annihilation in the Nature of Things. The Scene of Nature, as changeable as it is, knows no Change beyond Corruption. A great many Changes indeed it has *besides* it, but none *beyond* it, which is a Change that affects not Being it self, but only the manner of it. As the greatest Change of Nature goes no farther than Corruption, so Corruption goes no farther than *Modality* of Being. It changes the whole *manner* of the thing said to be corrupted, but destroys nothing of its Substance. This is all that Corruption means ; and of this indeed there is an infinite deal in the World, the very course of which is carried on by it. For every motion in Nature is a step towards Corruption, tho' even that also be in order to a new Generation of one thing or another. So that Corruption, tho' it be
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only a Modal Change whereby a thing loses not its Being, but only the former manner of it, seems yet not to be the thing intended in Nature, much less then *Annihilation*. For all Motion in Nature is *ad esse*, or to Being as the ultimate Term of it. And if not Being even in the *modal* sense be taken in the way, 'tis only as not Being makes way for Being, that is, as not being in *this* manner is introductory to Being in another, much after the same manner as is said of Privation, when it is made a Principle of Natural Things. So that *Being* is still the thing in design. Accordingly *Naturalists* have been always very shy of having recourse to Annihilation in any of the Accounts which they give of Physical Effects, looking upon it as an Unphilosophical thing, to solve the Phenomena's of Nature by what Nature her self is utterly unacquainted with. And, Sir, you know *Descartes* * carries this so far, that he is for having not only the same quantity of *matter*, but even of *motion*, which is only a *mode* of matter to be conserv'd intire, as first impress'd by God, in the whole Universe, tho' it may vary

* *Princip. Philosoph. Pars secunda*, p. 38.

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by being more or less in the several Parts of it. And he is so far from supposing any such thing as *Annihilation*, that he will not allow us to suppose so much as any *change* in the Works of God, those Changes only excepted which evident Experience, or Divine Revelation certifies us of, and which we perceive may be done without any Change in the Creator, and that lest we should suppose any Change or Inconstancy in him. Which I find he thinks *Annihilation* does imply, that being the Ground upon which he builds the conservation of Matter and Motion in the same quantity. But as to that matter I have already given my Opinion in favour of the *Negative*, not seeing any absolute necessity that *Annihilation* should import any such Change in God. However since here are two very great Men that think it does, and it must be confess'd that the thing it self does carry a strong Appearance of it, I think this may be a Consideration of *Caution*, how we attribute it to God, lest we should charge him with Inconstancy, with whom, as St. *James* tells us, there is neither *variableness*, nor so much as *shadow* of Turning.

38. These, Sir, I offer only as probable Arguments, or Reasons of *Congruity*, (that only

only excepted which touches upon Revelation as to Heathen's being concern'd in the Final Judgment) for the matter will not afford strict *Demonstrations*. But however, as far as these Considerations are of force against Annihilation, so far they are also *Proofs* of the actual *Immortality* of the Soul as to *Being*, or its uncessant Subsistence. But I confess demonstrative of neither. For *that* Immortality being, as I have shewn, wholly of a *Positive* kind, and not founded in the Nature of the Soul, which of it self however Incorruptible, is yet still absolutely *Annihilable*, 'tis, I think, plain that it cannot be demonstrated by any Physical Arguments. Not, I mean, from the Nature of the *Soul*. And therefore if it be at all demonstrable, it must be from the Nature of *God*. And indeed if it could be proved that Annihilation did infer any real *Change* in God's Will, the Argument taken from the Divine Immutability would be a very good *Demonstration* of the matter, and we need not desire a better. But that failing, or at least not being certain, I do not see how it is capable of any strictly so call'd. And therefore, I think, they must be own'd to be so far in the right, who say that there is nothing in Natural Reason sufficient to demonstrate

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demonstrate the Immortality of the Soul; if by Immortality they mean that which respects *Being* or Subsistence. And the Case is all the same as to *Annihilation*; there is no more Demonstration *against* that, than there is *for* the other. But however, tho' the Evidence be not full, yet if that which is be all on one side, and that too as great as the matter will afford, it ought to be sufficient. For as *Aristotle* observes in his *Morals* *, Nothing ought to be thought wanting, if a thing be explain'd according to the nature of the subject matter. Κατὰ τὴν ἰσχυρομένην ὁρᾶται. Which Observation may also hold the stronger here, because the matter, as was before noted, requires so little Proof. For being in Possession of Being, we may more reasonably expect the exhibition of a *better* title than to be put upon proving our *own*, and may justly presume against Annihilation till there shall appear good Reason for it, which I am apt to think will not be in haste produced. And therefore upon the whole the result is, that it seems an unreasonable thing to suppose any such thing as Annihilation, and that not only as to Human Souls (tho'

* *Lib. 1. cap. 1.* to the like purpose also in *cap. 7.*

of them chiefly) but as to any other Substance. And accordingly I cannot but join at least so far with the most ingenious Author of the *Theory* of the *Earth*, as to reject the Supposition of those, who attempt to explain the universal Deluge by a new Creation of Waters for that purpose, and then by an after Annihilation of them again when the Deluge was over, as an *Unphilosophical Hypothesis*.

39. And thus far our Natural Reasonings may carry us against Annihilation, and by consequence also towards the Proof of that Immortality of the Soul which is opposed to it, as involv'd in the same Bottom. Which by the way gives a farther advantage to the present Argument, in that the Immortality of the Soul is also so far proved by it. Whereas you who hold *Annihilation* can never hope to prove the Immortality of the Soul as to *Being* by any *Natural* Reasonings, or indeed so much as to have any such Reasonings for the Proof of it. And tho' ours may be thought not demonstrative, (which is freely own'd) yet as probable Arguments are better than none, and such too as ought to satisfy where better are not to be had, so whatever is short or defective in them may be supplied by a more sure word of Prophecy,

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Divine *Revelation*, which we who hold no such thing as Annihilation can plead in its full strength and importance for the Soul's Immortality. Whereas you by supposing the Annihilation of so many, do by the liberty of those numerous Exceptions very much weaken the force of the General Rule, and render the Application of it very uncertain, and so have not the intire Benefit of *that* neither. So that the result in short is this. Natural Reason you cut your self off intirely from; and as for Revelation, which is our main, and your only support in this matter, that by your Principle of Annihilation you have not so much benefit of as we who hold none have, tho' you *need* it much *more*.

40. And so I come now to the last thing in Reserve against your Hypothesis of Annihilation, *viz.* the great suppletory and over-ruling Argument of Divine *Revelation*. Which may be pleaded when all fails, and will even then be sufficient. Not that we pretend any exprefs Revelation against Annihilation. There is no occasion for that. *Nature* has no *Instance*, and *Philosophy* has no *Fear* of any such thing; and tho' the Scripture may affirm some things beyond the Course and Power of Nature, as in the Doctrin of the *Resurrection*,

rection, yet there is not the like need that it should make an exprefs Declaration againſt that which Nature knows nothing of. An exprefs Declaration therefore here is not to be expected. But we have what is tantamount to it. We have a Poſitive Revelation of a Future State, and of our Concern in it. We have alſo a plain Revelation of the two great Differences of that State, Happineſs and Miſery, and of each of them that it ſhall be everlaſting, and without end. Which neceſſarily ſuppoſes them as durable Subſiſtence of the Perſons concern'd in them. And the Declarations that are made concerning theſe things are deliver'd in the moſt general Terms, without any one exception or limitation whatſoever, the Conditions which are annex'd to theſe general Declarations being only ſuch as ſpecify the Qualification of the *Perſons* to this or that *Portion* of the Future State, and not ſuch as ſerve to ſpecify their Qualification for the *State* it ſelf, as that they ſhall be *Chriſtians*, or *Baptized Perſons*, &c. No, the ſtate of the World to come, and of that Life and Immortality which is brought to life by the Goſpel, is propoſed in common, and none are excluded from it. And what limitations there are as to the Differences of

this After State in relation to Happiness or Misery, they concern only the particular Determination as to this or that part, and not the Truth or Necessity of the general Disjunctive. Add to this, that the opening of this great scene of Eternity is to be introduced by a Resurrection from the Dead, and by a final Judgment, the universality of both which is described by the most comprehensive terms, as, *All that are in the Graves shall hear his Voice*, John 5. 28. *And before him shall be gather'd all Nations*, &c. Mat. 25. 32. Where besides the Absurdity of supposing a Resurrection of Persons by and by to be annihilated, (for to what purpose should such Persons be raised) 'tis expressly said of them of whom the Text speaks, that is of *All*, that they shall have their share in the Sentences of the Judgment; which Sentences being final, they are to be everlastingly happy, or everlastingly miserable, and so must everlastingly exist. And besides, if the Judgment it self be universal, there is no doubt but that the *Sentences* of it are so too, and so all must be concluded under the Dilemma of Everlasting Happiness or Misery, and so again must have an Everlasting Subsistence. And since all these things are generally proposed and without any

any exception, either as to the Resurrection, Final Judgment, or what follows upon it, I know not what Reason or Authority we have to make any, nor indeed how we can do it without shaking the Foundation of the whole. And therefore, Sir, tho' I do and must agree with you so far in your ill sounding and ill receiv'd Assertion of the *Natural Mortality* of the Soul, as to allow the Soul to be indeed Naturally Mortal as to *Being*, yet I can by no means consent with you (as great a deference as I have for your Authority) in supposing that God will leave these, or any of these, Naturally Mortal Souls to their Natural Mortality, by withdrawing from them what is necessary on his part for their farther Subsistence, or, which is all one, that he will *Annihilate* them. But rather, that he will always uphold and sustain them in that Being which he once freely and wisely gave them, and that so, tho' Mutable in *themselves*, they shall be Immutable in *him*.

41. And thus far against your supposed *Annihilation*. But, Sir, I must humbly crave your leave to divide yet farther from you, not only in supposing that the Soul is not to be left to her Natural Mortality, tho' as to Being Naturally Mortal, but that

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that there is also a sense wherein she may be said to be Naturally *Immortal*, viz. that of *Incorruptibility*, which is grounded upon the Spirituality or Immateriality of her Nature. This (not the Consequence, I mean, but the Principle) will not I find pass with you, and you contend in some Instances against it, and perhaps farther than I am concern'd to ingage. For, Sir, you may please to remember that in the *Philosophical Discourse* I undertook not professedly to prove the Conclusion, but only to state the Question. Not to evince that the Soul is Naturally Immortal, but to shew and explain in what sense it is so, and that for the better understanding the precise sense of what you had indefinitely deliver'd concerning its *Natural Mortality*. Which absolutely speaking I thought was not true, but in a certain respect might, I thought, and ought to be allow'd. Accordingly after having premised a Distinction of Immortality, I observ'd that as Immortality related to *Being*, so the Soul was not naturally Immortal, as having no Foundation in its Nature for such an Immortality. But indeed as Immortal signified the same as *Incorruptible* (which it might well do because Corruption is a sort of *Death*, and implies a ceasing to be as
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to this or that manner, tho' not absolutely) in that sense I shew'd that the Soul according to the Notion which we generally have of it, and allowing it to be such a sort of Being as it is ordinarily conceiv'd to be, that is a *Spiritual* or Immaterial Being, was in the strictest sense of the words, naturally Immortal, so as not to be capable of Corruption, tho' as a Creature still liable to Annihilation. So that I proceed, as you may see, all along Hypothetically, upon the supposition of the receiv'd Notion of the Spirituality of the Soul, upon that ground stating its Incorruptibility. And so am in strictness concern'd rather for the Truth of the Consequence, *viz.* the Incorruptibility of the Soul, whether it rightly flows from that suppos'd Principle, than for the Principle it self.

42. But however, that a Point of so considerable Importance, and upon which so much depends, as the Immateriality of the Soul may not be left under the *suspence* of a *Supposition* only, I shall here offer something towards the Proof of what in my former Treatise I was willing to suppose. And here to say that the more the Soul abstracts from the Body, or from the commerce of Sense, the more perfectly she operates, tho' true and not only taken
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notice of, but much inculcated by *Plato* in his *Phædo*, who accordingly there represents Philosophy as the Meditation of Death; yet this rather proves the Distinction of the Soul from its own Body, than from Body at large. And the like may be said of another noted Observation, that while the Soul is in the Body it does not partake of its *decays*, or grow languid by Age, but rather advances in Wisdom and Understanding, and often exerts it self with most Vigour, when the Body is at the lowest ebb of Health. These, I say, and such like Arguments relating to the Independency of the Soul upon the Body, do not, in my Judgment, prove that the Soul is distinct from Matter, but only from that particular and gross System of it which she animates, which she may well be, and yet be Matter still, tho' more subtilized, and cast in a finer Mould. To infer therefore that the Soul is Immaterial because distinct from the Body, or to conclude *this* Proposition when the *other* should be infer'd, would be the same Confusion as to infer her Immortality of Existence because she does not perish upon leaving the Body; as if surviving the Body and always remaining were the same thing: A Confusion however that is often
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committed. I shall not therefore make use of such Reasonings, because they do not (however otherwise considerable) conclude for the true Point in Question, the Immateriality of the Soul, but only that the Soul is not the Body, or that Soul and Body are two things; which none, I presume, but they who hold the Soul to be the *Harmony* or Temperament of the Body (tho' even *they* suppose it at least *modally* distinct from it) did ever deny. For that Soul and Body, meaning by Body a certain portion of organized Matter, are distinct, or that we have something besides this sensible System which gives Life and Motion to it, upon this Distinction of Soul and Body the Discourse of the whole World turns, and not only the Heathen Philosophy, but even their Poetry is pregnant with it. Witness that of *Horace* :

——— *Fragilemq; hunc Corporis usum*
Desertorem Animi ———

As also that of *Homer*, when *Iliad* 13.
speaking of the Slaughter of *En-*
chenor by *Paris*, he says, that his Mind de-
parted from his Members.

————— ὅτε δ' αὖτις
ἔκλειψεν ἀπὸ μέλεων ———

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The like also he says of another somewhere, whose Name I have forgot, that his Mind forsook his Bones ;

—— λίπτε δ' ὅστέα θυμῶς.

But this will go but a little way. The precise Point is, not whether the Soul be distinct from the Body, but whether it be in it self absolutely Incorporeal, or only another finer Body, or a Body within a Body, which the forementioned Arguments do not reach.

43. Now as to this *Immateriality* of the Soul, the common way of proving it has been from the *manner* of its Operations, as that it contemplates universal and common Natures abstracted from all Materiality, forms conceptions of immaterial Objects, reflects upon its own Acts, &c. By which and the like Operations it seems elevated above the nature and condition of Matter. And perhaps so it may. Only I have this to say, that if once we allow Matter to think at all, how shall we know *when* or *where* to stop, what Perfection of Thought it may be capable of, or when consequently that of the Soul is so great as to elevate her above the Condition of Matter. And therefore I should think that it may not be so well to prove the Immateriality

teriality of the Soul from any certain *manner* of Thinking, as from *Thought* it self; which if we can shew to be the peculiar Priviledge of the Soul, so as to exclude Matter intirely from it, the Work is done. For if these two are distinct things, a Material Being and a Thinking Being, then as on the one hand a Material Being cannot think, so it follows as evidently the other way, that a Thinking Being, such as the Soul is, cannot be Matter.

44. Now for this, and consequently the Immateriality of the Soul, I think the best, the most simple, and most direct Argument is that of *Descartes*, taken from the Distinction of the Ideas, whereby these things are conceiv'd. The Ideas of an extended Being or Matter, and of a Thinking Being, are distinct; therefore the things themselves are also distinct. They are conceiv'd by distinct Ideas, therefore they are distinct things. The Reason of the Consequence is, because we who think by Ideas have no other way whereby to judge of things, or of their Differences, but by the Difference or Distinction of their Ideas. And by this it is that we do actually judge of the Distinction of things, both in *Physical*, *Mathematical* and *Moral Beings*. We have no other reason to think a Man not to be a

Horse, or a Circle not to be a Square, or Vertue not to be Vice, but because of the different Ideas whereby we conceive these things. And so in all other Cases, wherever the Ideas are distinct, we must conclude the things to be distinct too, and cannot possibly think otherwise if we will think at all about them. This Argument I know not how to resist, but must needs confess it to be demonstrative of what it undertakes, always provided that the Ideas are compleat Ideas, and in themselves distinct, and not made so only by *Abstraction* or inadequate Conception. For then indeed the Argument will not hold, that is, it will not follow that the Things are distinct, because the Ideas of them are so. As for instance, *Figure* and the Body *figured*. These are Ideally distinct, and we may conceive one without the other, that is, not conceiving the other. And yet it will not follow from hence that therefore these are really distinct Things. And that because the Ideas are incomplete and inadequate Ideas, Figure and the Body figured being really the same, only partially and separately consider'd. For when such a Substance is consider'd Absolutely, then 'tis Body, and when as under such a Mode or Manner of Being, then 'tis Figure, which

which makes the Ideas formally distinct, tho' indeed the thing is but one. For if the Body were adequately consider'd, we must consider it *with* its Figure, and then the Body and the Figure would make but one Idea, but being consider'd partially it makes two; but that Distinction goes no farther than the Operation of the Mind, and does not infer any real Diversity in the thing. So again *Figured Substance* and *Moveable Substance*. These are distinct in their Ideas, but because this is only by the Abstraction of the Understanding conceiving a thing inadequately, it does not thence follow that these are two really distinct things; and he must be a very bad Logician that shall think so, since 'tis one and the same Substance that is the common subject of both these Modes, only consider'd now under one formality, and now under another, but in neither compleatly as it is.

45. A Distinction therefore of Ideas arising from Abstraction or inadequate Conception will not do. For this is only a formal Distinction, or as the *subtil Doctor* chuses rather to call it *, a *Formal non*

* *In lib. prim. sen. Distinct. 2. Quæst. 7.*

Identity, which does by no means infer a real Diversity in things, as he shews in the Example of the Divine Essence and its Relations. Now indeed if this be the Case as to Thinking Being and extended Being, or Matter, I own that the Argument falls. But I hope, Sir, to make it very probable at least that it is not so. For to return to the foremention'd Instances. Tho' I can conceive Figure without the Body figured in the way of Abstraction, yet I cannot (nor you I presume neither) have a compleat conception of Figure without the Thing wherein the Figure is, so as to be able to conceive Figure, supposing there were no such thing as a figured substance in Nature. For Figure must be conceiv'd in a thing extended, being nothing else but the Termination of that Extension. And besides 'tis of the Nature of all Modes not to be compleatly conceiv'd without the Substance modified, tho' the Substance may be compleatly conceiv'd without its Modes. So again, tho' I can conceive a Figured Substance without a Moveable Substance, that is, by stopping at the first without proceeding so far as to take the other into the same Thought, yet I could have no Notion of Figured Substance if I should suppose there was no such

such thing as Moveable Substance ; because it being the same Substance (*viz.* Body) which is the common Subject of both those Modes, by removing one I remove both, and so have nothing left to abstract from. But now as to the present Case, I can conceive a Thinking Being not only *without* Matter, (which is the utmost stretch of the other Instances) but even tho' I should suppose that there was no such thing as Matter at all, not only precisively, but exclusively without.

46. Tho' I should put away all Matter intirely from me, yet I should have as clear and as full an Idea of a Thinking Being as I have now. Nay, as I can *conceive* a Thinking Being, so I can also conceive it to *Be*, that is, I find no repugnance in such a Conception, tho' I should suppose Matter not to be, or never to have been. And for this I need go no farther than *my self*. I who can doubt of the Existence of all Bodies, find that I cannot possibly doubt of the Existence of my own Mind, since that very doubting would evidently prove it ; and if I can conceive my own Mind as existing even while I doubt whether there be any Body or no, then I may as well conceive a Thinking Being to be, tho' I should suppose Body not to be. Let any
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one apply this to Figure and the thing Figured, or to Figured Substance and Moveable Substance if he can.

47. But tho' I need go no farther than my self for this, yet it may deserve to be here farther remark'd that we must have a Conception of a Thinking Being antecedently to the Existence of Matter, or else we could not conceive it possible that it should exist. Now this is conceiving it *without* Matter with a witness, not in the way of Abstraction, but in the way of real Separation, because we conceive it as *before* it. And if we can and must conceive it Antecedently to the Existence of Matter, then even now Matter *does* exist, we may as well conceive it to be tho' we should suppose Matter not to exist. Should all the Matter in the World be annihilated, yet we may still conceive a Thinking Being to exist, as well as we could conceive it to have existed *before* any such thing as Matter was in Being. Especially when 'tis farther consider'd that this same Thinking Being, whom we must conceive Antecedently to the Existence of Matter, is also a necessary and independent *Being*, and to whom it is even Essential to *Be*, and whom therefore we cannot conceive but as actually *Being*, and that whether we suppose Matter (or indeed

indeed any *Spirit* besides himself) in *Being* or no. Now this again is altogether in *Peculiar*, being all over unapplicable to the Case of Figure and the thing Figured, or to Figured Substance and Moveable Substance. For as we cannot conceive Figure, or any particular Figure to exist without the Substance Figured, or a Figured Substance to exist without a Moveable Substance, so much less can we have a conception of either of them as existing antecedently to the Existence of the other. Now this shews a vast disparity in the two Cases, that these things however Modally and by Abstraction divided are yet really the same, and that the other, *viz.* the Ideas of Thinking Being and extended Being, however some may hope to *consolidate* them in one, are as really distinct.

48. And indeed if they were not, but were only diversify'd by Abstraction tho' really the same, in like manner as we conceive of Figured Substance and Moveable Substance, then it may be farther consider'd that however by such an Abstraction one of these Ideas may not formally *include* the other (else there would be no Abstraction) yet it would never be found to *exclude* it, even as Figured Substance tho' not as such including, yet never positively
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excludes Moveable Substance. On the contrary, as every Figured Substance is also a Moveable Substance, and *vice versâ*, so every Thinking Being would then be also an extended Being, and so *vice versâ*. But now we know there is a Thinking Being whose Idea is exclusive of all Extension as utterly incompatible with the Absolute Perfection of his Nature, and who accordingly is not and cannot possible be material. Here therefore Thinking *Being* and extended *Being* are not only notionally, but really and actually divided. But now we have no such Instance on the other side. There is no such thing in Nature as a Figured Substance that is not also in reality a Moveable Substance too. Which again shews a great diversity in the two Cases, and consequently that no Argument drawn from the real Identity that is in the one, can be reasonably used to conclude the like Identity in the other.

49. And therefore if it should be objected, that tho' Figure be formally distinct from Motion, yet Figured Being and Moveable Being are really all one, the same extended Substance being the common subject of both those Modes. And so tho' Thought and Extension are Ideally distinct, yet there is no necessity that Thinking Being and
Extended

Extended Being should be really different, but that the same Being may be both Thinking and Extended. To this it is answer'd, that (besides the unreasonableness of supposing two such dissimilar and unproportionate Modes to belong to one Subject) there is a great deal of reason to think the contrary from the completeness and incompleteness of these Ideas respectively, which shew too great a Disparity in the two Cases, than that one should conclude the other, as has been already discours'd. But then for the farther opening of this Disparity there is one thing more to be observ'd, and which perhaps may otherwise escape observation, and that is, that the Instances of Thinking Being and Extended Being, and Figured Being and Moveable Being, besides the completeness of the Ideas in the former, and their incompleteness in the latter, are otherwise not *parallel* Instances. They seem indeed to be so, and 'tis like have been taken for such; but if we look nearer we shall find that they are far from being so. For when we say that Figured Substance is really Moveable Substance, however formally distinct from it, the meaning is not in a direct way of Predication, but only that Figure and Motion

are both Modes of the same common Subject, *viz.* *Extension*. And so that which is Figured is also Moveable, the same in the common Subject, tho' not in the *Attribute*. But now should any one, presuming upon the Parity of this supposed Parallel, say, that Thinking Being is really Extended Being; this cannot mean as if Thought and Extension were also fellow *Modes* of the same Subject. For Extension is not a Mode or Manner of Being, as Figure or Motion is, but the very *Formal Reason* or *Essence* of a certain Being, that Being which we call *Matter*. And therefore Thinking Being will not be Extended Being in the same sense as Figured Being is Moveable Being; that is, it will not be Extended Being, as that signifies a Substance that has Extension belonging to it as a *Mode*, but as Extended Being signifies a Substance whose *Essence* is to be extended. But is this possible to be conceiv'd? Indeed Figured Being may be the same really as Moveable Being, because that only signifies that the same Being that has the Mode of Figure is also capable of that of Motion. But can an Extended Being, meaning by it a Being whose *Essence* is to be extended, be a Thinking Being? Will not this be the same as for *one* thing

to be *another* ? Without doubt yes, if Thinking Being be taken (and why should it not) as Extended Being is, *viz.* for a Being whose Essence is to think. For can any things be more distinct than these things are ? And how then can we say that one is the other, without mixing and confounding our Notions, and jumbling away that diversity of things wherein the Order and Beauty of Nature consists.

50. If to evade this it be pretended, that Thought is a *Mode* of Extended Being, and so the same Being is both thinking and extended, I desire it may be remember'd, that Extended Being here, as was before observ'd, signifies the same as a *Being* whose *Essence* is to be extended ; so that Thought will not be a joint or fellow Mode of some third thing to which Extension also belongs as a *Counter-Mode*, (as in the Case of Figure and Moveable Being) but it will be the immediate Mode of *Extended Being* it self. That is, it will be the Mode of Matter, as directly as Figure or Motion is. And this perhaps is the very thing that some *Materialists* drive at. But against this Conceit, I have two things to say. First, that a Mode being not the thing it self, but only a certain manner of being of it, must follow the nature

nature of that thing whose Mode it is. As Figure which is a Mode of Extension, (as being the Termination of it) follows the Nature of Extension, so that it cannot be the Mode of any thing else but what is extended. Supposing any Spiritual or Immaterial Being, Figure could not be the Mode of it. But now what Agreement or Proportion is there between the Nature of Thought and Matter, that Thought should be supposed to be the Mode of it. Figure carries a Proportion, and so does Motion, but Thought has evidently none at all. And therefore as Figure cannot be the Mode of Spirit, so neither for the same Reason can Thought be the Mode of Matter. But then again in the second place, it is farther to be consider'd, that tho' the Thing may be well enough conceiv'd without its Mode, because of the Absoluteness of its Nature, yet the Mode implying a relation in it, cannot be clearly and fully conceiv'd without conceiving the Thing too whose Mode it is, much less can it be conceiv'd if one should suppose the Thing not to be, or so much as doubt whether it be or no. As is plain in the Case of Figure and Motion with relation to Extension. If then Thought were the Mode of Matter, it could no more be clearly

clearly and fully conceiv'd without it, than Figure or Motion can, which indeed are Modes of it. But now on the contrary, we have a clear and distinct conception of Thought not only without conceiving Matter with it, but even if we should doubt whether there be any such thing in Nature or no, or should even suppose it not to be at all. This is more than can be said of Figure or Motion; whereby it appears that they indeed are Modes of Matter, as depending upon it even in the very conception as well as the thing, and the contrary Reason seems to conclude as strong, that Thought is not. In sum then, for the better clearing and recollecting the foregoing Process, I would ask those who contend for the Formal Distinction only, but real Identity of Thinking Being and Extended Being, in what sense they mean, or would have this to be understood. What *we* mean that say they are really distinct, is very plain; but it seems not so plain but that one may reasonably inquire, what it is that *they* mean who say they are really one and the same: Do they mean that a Being whose *Essence* is to think, is the same with a Being whose *Essence* is to be extended? This would be a manifest Confusion, or a making one thing

thing of two. For Thought and Extension being plainly two things, 'tis as plain that a Being whose Essence is to think, must be really distinct from a Being whose Essence is to be extended. Or do they mean when they say they are the same, that the same thing is both Thinking and Extended; that is, that Thought is a Mode of the same common Subject whereof Extension is also a Mode, and so that Thinking Being and Extended Being are the same, in the same sense that Figured Being and Moveable Being are the same. But then we could no more conceive a Thinking Being exclusively of an Extended Being, than we can conceive Figured Being exclusively of Moveable Being, as was discoursed before. Or else in the last place, taking Extended Being, as 'tis reasonable to take it, not for a Being that has Extension belonging to it as a Mode, but for a Being whose *Essence* is to be extended, do they mean that Thought is a Mode of this extended Being, that is a Mode of Matter? But why this Sense cannot be admitted, was the very last part of our Account. And therefore since there is reason to think that they are not the same in any of these Senses (which are all that the matter will receive) it seems to remain that they must be really distinct things.

51. But

51. But after all, if we examin the Idea we have of Matter we shall find that Thought is not at all contain'd in it, not so much as in the way of a *Modality*. And accordingly Mr. *Locke*, as willing as he seems that Matter should *stand* for its *grace* in order to commence Graduate in the Art of Thinking, does yet openly acknowledge in his Reply to the Bishop of *Worcester*, (p. 397) that Thought is not included in the Essence of Matter. Only in defect of this he flies to the Omnipotence of God, which he fancies may make it think notwithstanding. But this methinks is not very Philosophically done. For at this rate we shall never be able to know when a thing is true or false, or when we have proved or disprov'd any thing in a Rational or Philosophical way, if Men shall have recourse to the Power of God, and think to turn the Balance of the Argument at last by that over-ruling Expedient. Besides, as infinite as the Power of God is as to all those things which are the proper Objects of Power, yet 'tis well known that there are some things that are simply *impossible*; and if this be not one of them, 'twill not be very easy perhaps to tell what is. But besides, lastly, how can this be done without changing

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the *Species* ? Indeed if God were to make Matter think by any thing contain'd within its Essence or Ideal Reason, as by a finer Mechanism or more advantageous Arrangement of its Parts (for this is within the Potential reach of Matter still) it would be another thing. But to make it think by a superinduction of a Power wholly foreign, by superadding a new Perfection or degree of Being that is not contain'd within the verge of its Idea, this must needs infer a change in the Species. For 'tis the Idea of a thing that bounds and determines its Species ; and therefore tho' the Essences of things may not be so strictly like *Numbers*, that the least Unit added shall cause a variation in them, yet he that made that Observation was undoubtedly so far in the right, that the superaddition of any Perfection (much more such a one as *Thought* is) that is no way contain'd in the Essence or Idea of a thing, but exceeds both the actual and potential extent of it, must necessarily infer a Change in the Species. And so instead of making Matter think, 'tis something else that will be made think, a production that is wholly new, and without a name. As the addition of a Man to a Horse makes a *Centaur*.

52. But that which I here chiefly insist upon is the Concession it self here made by Mr. *Locke*, that Thought is not included in the Essence of Matter, wherein he seems to grant as much as our Cause requires, and indeed more than is to be salv'd again by any after-expedient. For, as Mr. *Collier* well observes in his Preface before a Translated Piece concerning the Natural Immortality of Human Souls, (and which one Remark is, in my Opinion, worth all the Book besides) *If the Idea of Matter is compleat without Thinking, if there is no such Faculty to be found about it, if there must be a foreign Power super-added before any thing of Thought can emerge, it follows evidently from Mr. Locke's Concession, that a Being capable of Thinking, must be of a nobler and quite different kind from Matter and Motion.* For to confirm, and perhaps a little illustrate what this Ingenious Gentleman here says, if Thought be not included in the Idea of Matter, then 'tis plain that the Idea of Matter is compleat without it; and if the Idea of Matter be compleat without Thought, then the Idea of a Thinking Being is as compleat without Extension; and consequently as Matter is not a Thinking Being, so it seems as plain on the other side,

that a Thinking Being is not, cannot be Matter. But what it positively is, that this way of Reasoning does not pretend to shew, nor perhaps is it possible for us, in the Light we are in at present, clearly to understand wherein the Nature of the Soul does consist. Nor is there any great need to inquire, it being enough to our present Concern that it is not *Material*, or an Immaterial Being. Not that we place the Essence of the Soul in a *negative*, as some may be apt to cavil. No, we know well enough that a specific difference of a thing must be positive; and 'tis a real positive Being that we understand under that Appellation; but not knowing precisely what it is, we express it negatively, as we are fain to do in some other Cases, and as we have a particular reason to do here, because the whole stress of the thing in Question turns upon this negative; so that if we did know the Nature of the Soul never so perfectly, yet we were here concern'd to consider it no otherwise than as *Immaterial*. For if the Soul be an Immaterial Being, as from the Ideal Diversity between Thought and Extension, and a Thinking and an Extended Being it seems reasonable to think it is, then the very next step is *Immortality*. And that in the
natural

natural sense of it ; for then it necessarily follows from the very nature of the thing that she is Immortal. Not as Immortal signifies *unperishable* or *indefectible* in Being (for Immateriality as such does not prove *that*, Spirit being as annihilable as Body) but as Immortal signifies *incorruptible* or *indissoluble*. Tho' these things are very often confounded.

53. And thus, Sir, I have persued this Argument as far as it will well go, and perhaps farther than it has yet been carried *. And upon the whole, it seems to bid fair towards a Demonstration, at least as much as one can reasonably hope to have in a thing of this nature. But whether it be Demonstrative or no, considering that great Men have been for it, and great (tho' perhaps not in the *thinking* way so great) Men have been against it, and withal how easy it is to be deceiv'd in ones Judgment in things of this Abstrusity, I shall not take upon me absolutely to determin. However being a celebrated Argument, I thought it worth while to lay it open in its full Light, and so leave

* See this Argument otherwise managed in the Second Part of my *Theory of the Ideal World*. Tho' I chuse rather to stand by this, as the more exact Account.

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it to be weigh'd and consider'd by better Judgments, and particularly by your self, to whose Judgment in this matter I shall have a particular regard. Only I have here one thing farther to note, that they who argue for the Immateriality of the Soul from the *manner* of its Operations, or particular ways of Thinking, are concern'd not to refuse this Argument from the Ideal Diversity of a Thinking Being and Body. Because if they once allow a real Identity in these things, and that Matter can think, the Foundation of their own Argument will fail. For if Matter can rise to such a thing as Thought, what will become of their particular ways? For tho' even supposing a capacity of Thought in Matter, there may be some particular ways of Thinking whereby the Soul may discover it self to be *independent* on the *Body*, (which Body may be as well as Spirit) yet I know not what particular ways of Thinking those are that shall prove the Soul to be absolutely *Immaterial*, supposing Matter can think at all. For if we once admit that, where shall we stop, or what particular ways of Thinking shall we appropriate to an Immaterial Being, so as thereby to prove the Soul to be one, if once Matter be allow'd *capable* of Thought.

So

So that they are obliged, in defence of their own Argument, to stand by this.

54. Which whether you will think conclusive or no, yet give me leave to tell you, that I cannot but wonder at two things. First, That any should look upon the Notion it self of an Immaterial Substance as a *Contradiction*, since 'tis plain that the word *Substance* is not here taken a *substando*, but a *subsistendo*, and denotes only such a Being as is subsistent by it self, as that signifies independently upon any other as a *Subject*. Unless they will suppose that there is no such Substance but what is Corporeal, which is to beg what they should prove. Secondly, I cannot but wonder that any allowing an Immaterial Substance not to be a *Contradiction*, should yet contend that no *created Being* can be Immaterial. So says *Curcellæus* * in expresse terms. *Nihil creatum esse potest planè incorporeum*. If indeed the very Notion of an Immaterial Being implied a *Contradiction*, or if all Being, even God himself were corporeal, it were another thing. For 'tis certain, that God cannot create a Being more perfect than himself.

* *Institutio Religionis Christiana*, p. 107.

But

But neither of these is pretended, but the quite contrary implied by the *Limitation*. But then why is such a Limitation made? For may we not apply what the Apostle says in another Case with some variation to this, why should it be thought a thing incredible with you that God should create an Immaterial Being? Is there any Repugnance between the Notion of a Creature and that of Immateriality? May not an Immaterial Being be full as dependant as a Material? Or is Immateriality an Incommunicable Perfection of the Divine Nature, and such as he cannot possibly invest a Creature with? No certainly, God may if he pleases communicate any Perfection or Degree of Being that is *Finite*, and may not a Spirit be of a Finite Essence as well as *Body*? I see nothing that should hinder, nor consequently why God may not make a Being like himself as to *Spirituality*, as well as in any other *limited* respect. Nay, it seems reasonable to think that he should make some such Beings for the greater Variety and Ornament of the Universe, (which would be but a dead lumpish thing if there were nothing but Matter in it) and that he might take the more delight in his Works, which are so far pleasing to him as Representative of him.

him. But whether he actually has made any such, or whether the Souls of Men in particular are in Fact such Immaterial Beings, is another Question.

55. Now as to this I have something farther to offer from *Authority*. As for *Human Authority* you know, Sir, I have *St. Austin* and the School-men on my side, with a Cloud of both Philosophers and Divines, Antient and Modern. And indeed most that are for the Immortality of the Soul, are also for its Immateriality, and commonly join them both together, (as *Plotinus* does in the *Seventh Book* of his *Fourth Ennead*) and prove the former by the latter; tho' indeed Immateriality does not prove the Immortality of the Soul at large, but only as to Incorruptibility, as I have already noted. And of that it is the only proper *Natural Proof*, so that as whoever holds the Soul to be Immaterial must hold it to be Incorruptible; so whoever holds it to be Incorruptible must in like manner (if he will be consistent with himself) maintain its Immateriality. Concerning which Immateriality of the Soul, not to multiply Testimonies, which in so confess'd a thing are endless, and to you, if to any one, certainly needless, I shall only beg your Per-

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mission just to set before you what St. *Austin* says in two places. One is in his Epistle to St. *Jerom*, concerning the Nature and Origin of the Soul, where you will find him asserting its Immateriality in these express words, *Incorpoream esse Animam, etsi difficile tardioribus persuaderi potest, mihi tamen fateor esse persuasum*. The other is upon the 145th Psalm, where he speaks thus, *Natura Animæ præstantior est quam Natura Corporis, excellit multum, res spiritalis est, res incorporea est, vicina est Substantiæ Dei. Invisibile quiddam est, regit Corpus, movet Membra, dirigit Sensus, præparat Cogitationes, exerit Actiones, capit rerum infinitarum imagines*. This last Expression of St. *Austin* seems to touch upon an Argument which may be made use of by some to prove the Immateriality of the Soul, taken from its being receptive of such infinite Images of Things, supposing it impossible that such abundance of Images should find room in a Corporeal or Extended Substance. But the *supposition* of this Argument, *viz.* that these Images of Things are really and subjectively in the Soul, is, in my Opinion, not so certain as it should be, to make it good. For tho' we understand by Ideas (which is what we are to mean by *Images*) yet these Ideas, according

according to my Philosophy, are not in the Soul, but in a superiour intelligible Nature, wherein the Soul only beholds and contemplates them. And so they are only *objectively* in the Soul, or *tanquam in cognoscente*, but really elsewhere, even in the intelligible World, that κόσμος νοητός which *Philo* speaks of, to which the Soul is united, and where she beholds them. And where Matter, were it *capable* of Thought, (which this Argument does not shew it is not) might behold them as well as the Soul. Which seems very much to dead the Force of this Argument. As it does also that of another, made use of by a * great Man, taken from the incorporeity of our *Ideas*, and thence inferring the incorporeity of the Soul; because an Immaterial Idea cannot be *subjected* in Matter. And indeed I do not see how it can; and therefore if it could be made appear that our Ideas, which I acknowledge to be incorporeal, were really and *subjectively* in the Soul, it might perhaps follow from hence that the Soul is incorporeal; but that being only supposed, and that too without any good Foundation of

* Bishop *Ward*, in his *Essay*, page 57.

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Reason, I think there is no great Force in the Argument. Perhaps it might be better if the incorporeity of the Soul were argued from the incorporeity of our Ideas *simply*, without saying any thing of their *subjective* Being in the Soul, and insisting only upon the Disproportion between an Immaterial Object, and a Material Faculty. And this, for ought I know, would be one of the best Arguments for the Purpose. But if Matter should be once allow'd capable of Thought, I don't see how this Argument will conclude neither; since if Matter can think at *all*, it may rise to the Contemplation of an Immaterial as well as a Material Idea. So that that part is in the first place to be secured, as was noted before. But this by the by.

56. I return now to *Authority*; and that which I insist principally upon is *Divine*. Not that I think the Holy Scripture is so plain and full in asserting the Immateriality of the Soul, as it is in asserting its Immortality; this being of greater and more immediate Concernment to the well-governing of Human Life than the other is, which is more of a Philosophical Nature, in which things Divine Revelation is generally more sparing and reserv'd.

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However there are some Intimations whence the Incorporeity of the Soul may be fairly gather'd ; a few of which I shall offer to your Consideration. As for the Distinction of Soul and Body, we meet with it at every turn in Scripture in the same manner as we do in Human Writings, or in common Discourse ; but *that* I do not take to be sufficient, since the Soul may be distinct from what we call the Body, and yet not be absolutely *incorporeal* in it self, as was before observ'd. However perhaps some Advantage may be taken of those words of our Saviour, *Fear not them that kill the Body, but are not able to kill the Soul*, Matth. 10. 28. or as it is in St. Luke, *and after that have no more that they can do*. This Text is commonly alledged for the Immortality of the Soul. But I think it does not prove it absolutely, but only, First, with respect to the Power of Men, that *they* cannot kill it. Secondly, with respect to any Bodily dependance ; implying that it may be separated from the Body without dying it self. But surviving the Body, and always living, are two things ; the former of which does not necessarily infer the latter. But that which I would observe here to the present purpose is, that killing the Body is a popular way

way of speaking ; for not the Body properly, but the *Man* it is that is kill'd. And therefore killing the Body can here strictly and truly mean only such violent *impressions* made upon the Body, whereby the *Man* is kill'd. And whereas our Saviour adds, *but are not able to kill the Soul* ; this being spoken in opposition to what is said before done to the Body, seems not to denote *Annihilation*, (for that is not the thing done to the Body ; and besides it would be too little to say they could not annihilate the Soul, since the Body is in that respect as much out of their reach as the Soul it self can be) but to signify such Violences or Outrages as are committed upon the Body, that they cannot commit any such upon the Soul. They can cut, wound, stab, break or bruise the Body till its Vital Aptitude be utterly spoil'd, but after they have done that they can do no more, the Soul is out of their reach, and can suffer no such Injuries by their worst Attempts. But why so, if not upon the account of its *Incorporeity*, which renders it impassible to any Physical Motion or Impulse. As even *Virgil* also observes upon the Occasion of *Æneas* being about to draw upon the Infernal Ghosts, which he represents as a vain attempt.

*Et ni docta comes tennes sine corpore Vitas
Admoneat volitare cava sub imagine Formæ,
Irruat, & frustra ferro diverberet umbras.*

57. This I say may be offer'd to Consideration. But that which I insist more upon is that the word *Spirit*, which is the very name whereby we express an incorporeal Substance in general, as also our own Souls in particular, and which our Saviour attributes to *God*, when he tells us that *God* is a *Spirit*, and which is also given in Scripture to the Third Person of the Blessed Trinity ; in both which Cases it must and is allow'd to signify not Metaphorically, as when we speak of our *Animal Spirits*, meaning only the finer parts of the Blood, but a Being strictly and properly Immaterial ; I say this word *Spirit* is the very word which the Scripture applies to signify that nobler part of us which we call our Soul in contradistinction to the Body. And indeed the word *Spirit* is much oftener made use of for this purpose than the word *Soul* is, and also set above it. For the word *Soul* in Scripture, especially in the New Testament, frequently, perhaps ordinarily, signifies no more than *Life*, that which is common to
Men

Men and Brutes ; whereas the word *Spirit* as it is always put for something of an Immaterial Importance, so when it is applied to Man, it signifies that Part of us which animates the Body, and which is the Principle of Life and Action, and whereby we think and understand, in opposition to the Body of Flesh. In short, it signifies that which we ordinarily call the *Soul*, for which the Scripture word is generally *Spirit*. Thus we read of the Rulers Daughter, that her Spirit came again, and Father into thy Hands I commend my Spirit, and Lord Jesus receive my Spirit, and the Spirit of a Man which is in him, and absent in Body but present in Spirit, and all Filthiness of Flesh and Spirit, and the Flesh lusts against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the Flesh. And not to multiply Instances of this kind, which are too many, and too well known to be particulariz'd, I shall only once for all observe, that St. *Paul* resolves the Human Compositum into Soul, Body and Spirit, 1 *Thes.* 5. 23. as so many constitutive parts of his *σάρκα* or compleat Man, which he represents as made up of these Ingredients, and which are the three things whereof a perfect Man does consist, as your own *Ireneus* (*lib.* 5. *cap.* 9.) will tell you.

you. And whether he may not bear a Resemblance of the Trinity in this, as well as some other respects, I leave to be consider'd. However 'tis sufficient to my present purpose, that Spirit is here assigned as a Part of Human Nature, which may reasonably be presumed to signify something Incorporeal, because all that is Corporeal is sufficiently denoted by the other two.

58. And thus the word *Spirit* which the Scripture attributes to God, it applies also to the *Soul*; which methinks it should not do if it were not truly an immaterial Substance as he is. For the farther and final clearing of which all the Question will be, whether this word *Spirit* be applied to God and to the Soul in one and the same sense? Now that it is indeed so, besides the oddness of supposing otherwise, I shall offer a Text or two to your Consideration, which I believe will put the matter out of all reasonable doubt. The first that I shall make use of for this purpose, is that of our Saviour, *God is a Spirit, and they that worship him, must worship him in Spirit and in Truth,* Joh. 4. 24. Here besides that the word Spirit is applied both to God and to the Soul in common, I farther contend that there is a
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necessity of understanding it in the very same sense. For observe, 1. the Nature of God is here declared. 2. The Duty of him that worships him is hence infer'd. God is a Spirit, a pure incorporeal Being. Therefore they that worship him must worship him in Spirit and in Truth; that is, in and with that Part of their Nature which symbolizes with, and answers to the Nature of God; or as a very Learned Expositor * expresses it, *agreeably to his Spiritual Nature, by giving up their Hearts and Spirits to him.* The Argument is Enthymemetical, wherein the major Proposition is suppress'd, and the Consequence infer'd from the minor. God is a Spirit, Therefore &c. The Force of which Consequence depends upon, and must be proved by this Principle, God must be worship'd agreeably to his Nature. And therefore *if* God be a Spirit, (as the minor says he is) he must be worship'd in Spirit. But now how does this Consequence follow, that God must be worship'd in Spirit because he is a Spirit, or how can the worshipping him so be said to be worshipping him agreeably to his Nature, if Spirit in

* Dr. Waitby in his Paraphrase on the New Testament.

God signifies one thing, and in Men another? But if it signifies the same in both, (as it must do to make the Argument good) then the Immateriality of the Soul is *concluded*.

59. When St. Paul tells us, that the Spirit (meaning the Holy Ghost) *bears witness with our Spirit that we are the Children of God. Rom. 8. 16.* Or when making a comparison between the Human and the Divine Spirit he tells us, *1 Cor. 2. 11.* that as *no Man knows the things (that is the secret things) of a Man, save the Spirit of a Man which is in him, even so the things of God knows no Man, but the Spirit of God*; is it to be imagin'd that in either of these places he uses the word Spirit in two senses, meaning one sort of Being when he applies it to God, and another sort of Being when he applies it to Man? No, as there is no reason for it, so the common way of speaking is against it. But I shall urge something that may be a little more convincing. St. Paul tells us, *1 Cor. 6. 16.* that as *he that is join'd to an Harlot is one Body, so he that is join'd to the Lord is one Spirit, that is, with the Lord.* They who interpret this our being one Spirit with the Lord, of our being partakers of his Spirit,

as if the Apostle meant only to say that Christ and true Believers have the same Spirit in common between them, or that they are acted and influenced by the same Spirit, seem to miss the Apostle's Design, to lose the Force of his Comparison, and not to come up even to the Literal Importance of his Words. For tho' it be true that all good Christians do partake of the Spirit of Christ (since if they have not his Spirit in them they are none of his, as the Apostle says *Rom. 8. 9.*) and tho' it be true also that they are hereby united to Christ their Head, yet this only makes them in a mystical sense *one with the Lord*, but does not make the Lord and them *one Spirit*. These are plainly two things, for Christians to be one with the Lord, and for them and the Lord to be one Spirit; and one seems to have been mistaken for the other. But to set the matter clear, we are to consider that the Apostle's Design here was to convince the *Corinthians* of the great Sin of Fornication. In order to this, among other Arguments, he insists upon this, that our Bodies (as well as our Souls) are the Members of Christ, and that by the Act of Fornication the same Bodies which are Members of Christ would also become the Members of an Harlot.

Harlot. Which he represents as an heinous Indignity. Now for the Proof of the latter, which was only implied before, he lays down this Proposition, that *he that is join'd to an Harlot is one Body*, referring to *Gen.* the 2d and 24th, for *two* (saith he) *shall be one Flesh*. In opposition to which, but plainly in allusion to it, says he, *But he that is join'd unto the Lord is one Spirit*. He that is join'd unto the Lord, that is by Charity and Divine Love in opposition to that Carnal and Sensual Love whereby a Man joins himself to an Harlot, is one Spirit with the Lord, as the other is one Flesh with the Harlot, or he and the Lord are one Spirit; that is, as much as two things can be one, not *Essentially* or *Personally* (for so they are still two) but *Morally* and *Mystically*, one not in the same *absolute* sense that the other are, (for that is a natural and this a spiritual union) but one in the same *proportional* sense; that is, that as the other by their corporal union become one Flesh, so these by their spiritual union become one Spirit. This seems to be the plain and natural sense and intention of this place. But now if Spirit here be taken in another sense than when 'tis applied to God, will not this be a strange Equivocation,

vocation, and such as will render the Apostle's Discourse (which otherwise makes very good sense) utterly impertinent, and indeed unintelligible? Suppose I should say, this Stone join'd to that makes one Stone; this would be easy and obvious to be understood, provided that I used the word Stone alike in both places. But if I should say this Stone (meaning a piece of Wood) join'd to that makes one Stone, would this be sense? Much such sense as the other would be, supposing the like variation of meaning. But there is otherwise no reason to suppose any such thing. For as *Flesh* and *Body* are meant in the same sense with respect to the Fornicator and the Harlot, so there is no doubt but that Spirit is so too in the parallel Instance. And if so, then this again concludes for the *Immateriality* of the Soul.

60. For the fuller Proof of which Conclusion, I shall beg your leave to insist upon one more Scriptural Argument, which I ground upon that peculiar Observation which the Divine Historian makes upon the Creation of Man, that he was created in the Likeness of God. And God said, *Let us make Man in our Image, after our Likeness. So God created Man in his own Image, in the Image of God created he him.*

Now

Now setting aside the Question, wherein the Image of God in Man does particularly consist, which would lead us a little too much out of our way to consider, I shall only inquire at present of what part of Man this is to be understood, that he is made in the Image and after the Likeness of God. To which I think I may positively and confidently answer, not as to his *Body*. For if Man be made in the Image of God *secundum Corpus*, then it will unavoidably follow that God is Corporeal, as St. *Ambrose* also observes in his *Hexaëmeron*, lib. 6. cap. 8. when he says, *Deus ergo Corporeus*. It will farther follow that God is or has a Body like unto ours, which will run us into the impious Heresy of the *Audians* or *Anthropomorphites*, that God has Hands, and Eyes, and Ears, &c. Whereby that of the Psalmist would be verifi'd in the grossest sense, *Thou thoughtest that I was altogether such a one as thy self*. Therefore this must not be meant as to his Body, but as to his Soul, even as the same Father also concludes, *Non ergo caro potest esse ad Imaginem Dei, sed Anima nostra*. Very well. But if the Soul it self be corporeal, then the very same absurd Consequence again returns, that God is a Body, which the
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good Father thought he had sufficiently declined by transferring the Image of God from the Body to the Soul ; which by the way plainly shews, that St. *Ambrose* thought the Soul not to be Corporeal. As indeed by a little reasoning upon this single Text it sufficiently appears that it is not. For if Man be made in the Image and Likeness of God in any Bodily respect (as he must be if he is all over Corporeal) then God must be Corporeal too, since otherwise we could not be *like* him. But 'tis plain both by Reason and Scripture, that God is not Corporeal ; and therefore Man is not made according to the Likeness of God in any Bodily respect, and therefore we are not all Body, but have something Immaterial in us, and of the same Spiritual Nature that God himself is, or else we could not be made in his Likeness, as we are here expressly said to be. And so the Immateriality of the Soul is again concluded *this* way.

61. I might farther have observ'd, that that Part of Man which we distinguish from the Body by the name of Soul, is call'd *Mind*, in Scripture, as well as *Spirit*. As when St. *Paul* complains of a Law in his Members warring against the Law of his Mind. Now what the Importance of

N^{ext} is in the Platonic Philosophy, and how much the Technical Terms of that Philosophy are used, as well as the Philosophy it self alluded to by the Sacred Writers in the New Testament, I suppose I need not tell *you*. And therefore dismissing the farther persuance of this Consideration, I shall add only one *Theological* Argument to the foregoing Scriptural Proofs. 'Tis certain that the Future and Final Happiness of Man consists in the Enjoyment of God, according to that of our Saviour Christ, *This is Life eternal, that they might know thee the only true God.* *Joh. 17. 3.* For God is the Good of our Souls; and if we are ever Happy, it must be in him. But now how can this be if the Soul be *Corporeal*, how will the Soul be then capable of enjoying God? For 'tis Similitude and Agreement that is the Foundation of all Pleasure or Happiness, without which tho' there should be *Possession*, yet there would be no *Fruition*. And for this reason it is among others, that we insist upon the Necessity of a *Holy Life*, and a Godlike Frame and Temper of Mind. representing them as in themselves indispensably necessary to fit and qualify Men for the Happiness of Heaven. And is not a *Natural Qualification*, do you
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think, as necessary as a *Moral* one? But now besides that Happiness is a *Thoughtful* Operation, and that we cannot conceive how Matter should be capable of any Thought, I say besides this, what suitability, or what proportion is there between an Incorporeal, and a Corporeal Being, that one should be Happy in the enjoyment of the other. Happiness requires Communion as well as Union; but what Fellowship or Communion can there be between two such Beings, that differ in the whole Kind, as Body and Spirit do, and consequently what Capacity for Happiness in the enjoyment of God, if *he* be a Spirit and the *Soul* a Body? 'Tis not, I think, to be conceiv'd how there should be any. No, it must be a Spirit certainly that must enjoy a Spirit. Those words of our Saviour, *God is a Spirit, and therefore must be worship'd in Spirit*, being as much or rather more applicable this way, God is a Spirit, and therefore must be *enjoy'd* in Spirit. Which again concludes very strongly for the Incorporeity of the Soul, to all those, I mean, who own the Principles of the Christian Faith. And for this reason perhaps it is, why God who is the Creator and Lord of all things, is said in Scripture to be the *Father of Spirits*, *Heb. 12. 9.*

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not only as created by him, for so the *Body* is too (tho' not so immediately) but because of their peculiar Relation and near Alliance to him, as being of the like Spiritual Nature with himself.

62. And thus, Sir, having freely given you my Sentiments as to the Immateriality of the Soul, wherein its Natural Immortality in the sense of Incorruptibility is also included, I should now hasten towards a Conclusion, but that you are pleased to throw a considerable, and as you seem to think, unanswerable Difficulty in my way, relating to *Intellectual Habits*, which in your Opinion is hardly to be accounted for upon the Hypothesis of the Soul's Immateriality. For say you, *Nor will you perhaps be able easily to give an account of that Habitual Facility we daily experience in our Minds, upon a frequent repetition of acts of the same kind, without Corporeity.* Perhaps so. For I acknowledge there is Difficulty in it, and so there is almost in every thing else; and the wiser one grows the more sensible one is of it. And where should one expect Difficulties, if not in things relating to the Soul, whereof we know so little. But as we do not think it a right way of Philosophizing to quit a Conclusion, which otherwise appears rea-

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sonable to us, because of some Difficulties that may lye against it which we know not how to solve; so there is the less reason to do so here, because knowing no more of the Soul than we do, that which is call'd a Difficulty may arise not so much from such a Property attributed to the Soul (which may be clear and right enough as far as it goes) as from our not having a more comprehensive Knowledge of its Nature, which if we had, the Difficulty perhaps would immediately vanish, just as it is in the Case of *Divine Providence*. However that you may not think I would put you off with an *Evasion* instead of an Answer, I shall endeavour to give you what Satisfaction I can in so dark a Matter. And if I have not the Happiness to convince you, yet I may have that at least of being corrected by you.

63. The Doctrin of *Habits* (a very fine and curious Part of Philosophy) I take to be very confusely, very obscurely, and very imperfectly deliver'd in the Schools. They make Habit to be one species of *Quality*, and Natural Power to be another. But I think it must appear exceeding plain to any one that will consider, that Habit is not an immediate species of *Quality*, but of that which they make the second species

species of Quality, *viz.* of Power. Which if instead of considering it only as *Natural*, they had divided as they ought into natural and acquired, they had found Habit comprehended under the latter, and so would have had no occasion to make it a coordinate species of Quality. For taking the word *acquired* in a large sense, not as connoting by repetition of acts, but only as opposed to natural, or as signifying the same as from *without*, I think it is very clear and certain that Habit, as to the generical part of it, can import nothing more or less than an *acquired Power*. And if they will call that a *Quality*, tho' it be a large and a confuse word, and that carries little Light in it, yet I shall not contend. But still 'tis not Quality, but that which they make the second species of Quality, *viz.* Power; or to speak more exactly, one of the species of Power, *viz.* *acquired Power*, that is the true genus to Habit. For to give the full Definition of Habit, I take it to be an acquired Power of acting, or doing a thing with readiness or facility. As suppose when a Musician plays readily upon an Instrument. I call it an acquired Power, because it does not flow from the Nature of the Subject, as some other Powers do, but is got some
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other way. A clear Instance of which two Powers we have in the swimming of a Fish, and the swimming of a Man. The Fish swims by a natural, the Man by an acquired Power, or Habit. Which indeed is ordinarily caused by the frequent repetition of Acts of the same kind. But I do not think fit to put that in the Definition of an Habit for two distinct Reasons. 1. Because the Cause of a thing ought not to be put into its Definition. For the Definition only expresses the *Quiddity* of a thing, and answers to the Question *what* it is. But *whence* it is, or what is the Cause of it, is another Question, and requires another Answer. 2. Because that is not the only, tho' the ordinary Cause of Habits, some of which may be acquired without any Practice or Application of ours, such as those they call *infused Habits*, (for they too are Acquired, as Acquired is opposed to Natural) as suppose the Theological Graces, or the Gifts of Tongues which the Apostles had, with other Ministerial Inablements. And therefore Habit which comprehends both, ought to be defined by that which is common to both, and not by that which would determine it to one, so as to exclude the other.

64. And thus our Idea of Habit I think is clear, which having stated, the next thing, and indeed the main thing, is now to consider the Cause of it, how and by what means it is produced. By the frequent repetition of Acts of the same kind, according to the Philosophy of the Schools. Which Account indeed is (ordinarily) true as far as it goes, but that is but a very little way. For the main Question is, Why the frequent iteration of similar Acts should beget this Power in us of operating so readily and expeditely. Upon this it is that the Theory of Habits depends, and without which it is so very imperfect, that it hardly deserves the Name of Philosophy to know the other. For who does not know that frequent use and practice makes a Man more ready and perfect? Is it not become a very Proverb among us, *Use makes Masterdom*? As when the Man carried his Calf, till he came to be an Oxe. A Country-man would say this was done by *use*. And so indeed it must, if it were done at all. But a Philosopher should not rest here. For the great Question is, how or why it is that Use or frequent Practice comes to be so perfective of any Operation? Now here I think the Old Philosophy fails us; and therefore we must consult
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our own Reflections with that Assistance which may be had from the New.

65. I suppose therefore (what I presume will be readily granted me) First of all, That the Soul, by that Law of Union whereby it communicates with the Body, has some way or other (whether as an Efficient or as an Occasional Cause it matters not) a Power to move it, or any Part of it at pleasure. Secondly, That this Motion is perform'd by the Animal Spirits as the immediate Instruments of it. Thirdly, That there is somewhere in the Brain a Store or Receptacle of these Spirits. Fourthly, That at this Receptacle of the Spirits is the meeting or concurrence of the Nerves. Fifthly, That these Nerves are implanted or inserted into the Muscles. Lastly, That the Soul has a Power (how we need not at present inquire) of determining the course of the Spirits which way it pleases, and of directing them by the Nerves into the Muscles of the Body : whereby those Muscles being distended, are consequently contracted, and so the Parts adjoining to them moved. And by this all Bodily Motion may be conceiv'd to be perform'd. Now this being supposed, it will not be very difficult to conceive how it may come to be facilitated or improved into a Habit.

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For tho' the Spirits will not at first find the Passages, through which they are to take their course, very free and open, as appears by the difficulty and awkwardness wherewith a Beginner in Music for instance moves his Fingers, yet by their continual course they may by degrees so smooth and open them, as to pass freely and without any resistance into the Parts that are to be moved. And then the Man is arrived to what we call a Habit. Not that in the exactness of speaking the formal Notion of a Habit does consist in the free course of the Spirits, or the plaining and opening the Passages, but rather in the very *Facility* of the Movement it self, or, as was said before, in the *Power* which we acquire of doing a thing with Facility. This is that wherein a Habit formally consists, but however it may be said to consist in the other so far as 'tis the immediate Reason or Cause whereby this Power is acquired. And now it plainly appears why and how the frequent Repetition of Acts of the same kind begets a Habit. For as the elicit Act of the Will for the doing any thing determines the course of the Spirits to this or that Part of the Body, so in the doing it the Spirits (which are the Instruments of Motion) are imploy'd,

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and the oftner it is done the more they are imploy'd, and the more they are imploy'd the more by their course they open and plain the Passages, till they find no longer any hindrance or resistance in their course, and then the Movement is perform'd with Facility and Expedition, and so the *Habit* is acquired.

66. You'll say, I suppose, that this Account goes no farther than *Corporal* Habits, as playing upon a Musical Instrument, Dancing, &c. It is true, and I intend it *directly* for no more. But then besides that, even in these Corporal Habits, the Mind is not without its Part, this will serve to give great Light to those other Habits too which we properly call *Intellectual*. The great difference between which two being, as I conceive, in general only this, that as in Corporal Habits the Mind originally moves the Body, so in Intellectual Habits the Body immediately moves the Mind, in the manner that I shall now explain. For it is to be consider'd, that as the Soul, by Vertue of its Union with the Body, has a Power to direct the Spirits to the several Parts of it, by which means certain Movements in the Body are consequent upon certain Thoughts of the Mind; so in Vertue of the same Union,
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certain Thoughts in the Mind are reciprocally consequent upon certain Impressions made upon the Body, and in particular the *Brain*. That is, we may suppose a connexion establish'd between certain Impressions made upon the Fibres of the Brain by the Spirits, (for we need not at present go so far abroad as *outward Objects*) and certain Ideas or Perceptions, which are by the Order and Institution of Nature rais'd and awaken'd by the occasion. Now if the Impressions made by the Spirits upon the Fibres of the Brain (as our Spirits are employ'd in thinking) explain by the expence of them (and the weariness which follows) does occasion *Thought* in the Mind, as the influx of the Spirits into the Muscles causes *Motion* in the Body, then as before the reason of those Bodily Habits consisted in the ready influx of the Spirits into the Muscles, so the reason of an Intellectual Habit will in like manner consist in the easy and free passing of the same Spirits to the Fibres of the Brain, whereby certain Thoughts and Ideas will be occasion'd. Which free and easy Passage we may suppose to be acquired by their frequent course that way, much after the same manner as in the other case. So that these things mutually illustrate and

reflect Light upon one another. Not that I pretend to an Exactness or a Fullness in either of these Accounts. Some Particulars here perhaps may not be so nicely right as they should be, and more, many more, may be wanting to compleat the Theory of this dark part of our Philosophy. But 'tis enough for the present purpose, if by this rude Draught I have represented the thing so intelligible that one may conceive it possible in this or some such way, that the Soul by its union with the Body may be capable of Habits, notwithstanding its being in it self of an *Incorporeal* Nature.

67. You'll say, perhaps, that this Philosophy is calculated for the union of Soul with Body, and does not reach a separate State. Why truly, Sir, if by separate State you mean a State wherein the Soul is *absolutely* separate from all Body whatsoever, I know not whether there be any such thing as a separate State. And indeed who knows but that the Soul upon her quitting this Body, may not be altogether *unclothed*, (for that would be a strange jump in Nature) but may according to the Notion of some Platonists, only change this grosser for a finer Vehicle. Nay may have such an *interiour* Cloathing, or Vehicle

hicle even at present, which she may then carry along with her. This may be for ought we know, and therefore it will be time enough to consider of a Philosophy that may fit a separate State, when such a separate State is proved. But if separate State be meant only for the State wherein the Soul is separate from this grosser Body, tho' at the same time united to a finer, then the Question of the Habits of the Soul will respect either the *acquiring* new Habits in that State, or the *retaining* old ones which were acquired in the former. If the acquiring new Habits, then since the Laws of Union with the Vehicle that the Soul then has, may be the same, or much the same, with those whereby she is conformed with this present Body, the foregoing Account may also be applied here too. For if the Wards are alike, the same Philosophic Key may serve. But if the Question be as to the possibility of retaining old Habits, according to that of *Virgil*,
—— *eadem sequitur tellure repostos* ; to this I say, that if the Vehicle belonging to the separate State be the same that the Soul had in this, accompanying her in her Exit, as who can tell but that it may, then perhaps this may be explainable from the Communication that was between this interior

terious Vehicle and the grosser Body, which may leave some abiding traces and impressions upon it, much after the same manner as M. Malebranche * explains the Communication that is between the Brain of the Mother and that of the Child wherewith she is pregnant. But indeed if in the separate State the Soul assumes a *new* Vehicle which she never had before, tho' she may then acquire new Habits by the Laws of Union with that new Vehicle, as she did while in the Body, yet I do not understand how according to this way of Philosophizing she can retain the old ones. I say not according to *this* way. But perhaps there may be some other way which we know not of. However this will not be a sufficient Reason to conclude against the Incorporeity of the Soul, because (as was before noted) the Insolubility of the Difficulty may proceed not from the Nature of that Hypothesis in it self, but from our Ignorance of the separate State, which I for my part freely confess.

68. *Your* Account of Habits from the addition or diminution of *like Parts*, viz. that the Accession of new homogeneous

* *Recherche de la Verité. Liv. 2. Chap. 7.*

similar Parts does increase the similitude between the Being to which those Parts are added, and the Object from whence they come. And that this similitude, with the help of these new Parts, may strengthen the Inclination to like Acts, as on the contrary, the expulsion of these similar Parts, and the succession of new ones of an heterogeneous and dissimilar Nature, may for the like reason diminish this Inclination, and introduce a contrary one ; I say this Account of yours (for I hope I have not misrepresented it in summing it up) is agreeable enough to the Principles of the *Atomic* Philosophy. But my first Exception against it, is, that this Account goes no farther than Corporeal Habits. Corporeal, I mean, not only with respect to the *Subject*, (for you seeming to acknowledge no other than such in Man, that may sufficiently answer your Design) but also with respect to the *Object*. But as Corporeal as you make the Soul to be, you must needs own that there are some Habits that are Incorporeal as to the *Objects* of them, as the Habits of Vertue and Vice. But now to such Habits your Account from the Accession of similar Parts cannot possibly be applied, as reaching no farther than such Objects as have Parts,
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and are as Corporeal as the Soul. For certainly those Objects which have no Parts, can have no *similar* Parts. But then secondly, as to these very Corporeal Habits, to pass over such a number of continual Effluvias which some perhaps would stick at, tho' I shall not stand with you about it, it seems hard to conceive how these Effluvias should so *incorporate* with our Bodies (much more with our Souls, even supposing them to be Corporeal) as to become so many Accessory Parts to them. That there is such a thing as Accession of new Parts from Nourishment, whereby the Aliment after several Digestions and Elaborations is at length transmuted into the Substance of the Body, is granted, and a very wonderful thing it is to consider. But how the Parts, whether similar or dissimilar, that flow from the Bodies that are about us should so incorporate with the Parts of our Body, is a very hard thing to understand. For this Accession as you call it must be a real *Incorporation*, and a Conversion into the very Substance of the Parts to which the Accession is made (as it is in Nutrition) so as to partake of the Juices and Spirits of the Body, or else how can they serve to Motion, any more than a wooden Leg
would

would do. But how such an Incorporation of so many foreign Parts should be, and that only by our conversing with some sensible Objects a little more than with others, or if such a thing were, how it comes to pass that Men do not improve in Bulk, and indeed grow to be Monsters, is what my Understanding does not readily apprehend. But in the third place, if these Parts should incorporate, and a Man had never so many similar Parts added, yet they would have no other effect than if the Man were so much naturally bigger, the effect of which might be to make him so much stronger and more able to act; but how this should determin him to such a particular kind of Action, or perfect him in it, is not easy to perceive. Besides fourthly, we must suppose in all Corporeal Objects that we have to do with, that there are vastly more dissimilar than similar Parts, and how then shall we acquire any Habit? unless you will suppose that the similar Parts are the only ones that fly off; for which I see no reason. Or that if the other fly off equally, yet the similar ones only unite and incorporate. But that you cannot say neither, because you make these dissimilar Parts to be that which expel the old, and produce contrary Habits.

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And since they may equally fly off, and do it seems incorporate as well as the other, 'tis hard to see which way a Habit can by this means be acquired. Besides in the last place, here seems to be some inconsistency in this Account. The reason of a Habit is made to consist in the Accession of similar Parts, and yet 'tis said that dissimilar Parts are productive of contrary Habits; now a contrary Habit is much a Habit as the first, which is as contrary to that as that is to this. And if dissimilar Parts produce a Habit, then how can the general reason of a Habit consist in the Accession of *similar* Parts. These are my Exceptions against your Account of Habits, the weight of which I submit to your better Consideration; with this only Remark, That if your Account should be found never so true, yet unless it be the *Only* Account, as well as a *True* one, it cannot conclude against the Immateriality of the Soul. And that it is not the only one that may be assign'd, what I have offer'd in that way may suffice to convince you.

69. And thus far of the Natural Immortality of the Soul with respect to Incorruptibility, which I *contend* for, in opposition to its Natural Mortality as to Being, which I freely *grant*. And as I grant that

to *you*, so you seem to give me some hopes as if you were inclinable to acknowledge the other with *me*. For tho' you had maintain'd the Natural Mortality of the Soul absolutely and indefinitely, yet you are pleas'd now to say, that neither your Cause, nor the Design of your Book, did oblige you to design any other Natural Mortality of the Soul than that which relates to Existence. Non-existence being that which would relieve *Infants*, and *Idiots*, and those who never did or could hear of the Gospel, from the Hazards of Eternal Misery, without intitling them to an Immortal Happiness, which others could not expect but by the Toils and Difficulties of a suffering self-denying Vertue, and yet without an Eternity of Existence, neither of Pain nor Happiness, to no purpose. Now not to insist upon the reason of this your Expedient, any farther than that it amounts to this, that God must be fain to annihilate these Persons, because he knows not how otherwise to dispose of them, which seems a little odd; that which I remark at present is, that you seem here to intimate that when you assert the Natural Mortality of the Soul, you mean only as to *Existence*. And indeed if so, we should soon be agreed; for that

I also affirm, and think necessary to be maintain'd. But besides that you should then methinks have limited your meaning, and not have affirm'd that absolutely, which is true only in a certain respect, you seem to fall off from this again by favouring the Soul's Diffolubility; and indeed I do not see how you can maintain the Natural Immortality of the Soul in the sense of Incorruptibility (which is the only Natural Immortality it can have) when at the same time you contend against its Immateriality, which is the only ground upon which that sort of Immortality can be built.

70. And whereas to that Observation of mine, that to affirm simply and indefinitely that the Soul is Naturally Mortal, when it is so only in a certain respect, implies as if it were *Mortal all over*, you are pleased to reply, that it must needs be Mortal all over if it be Mortal at all, upon the Hypothesis of making it a pure Spirit, and incapable of Parts; to this give me leave to answer, that tho' it be indeed a plausible and a surprizing turn, yet upon Examination it will be found to proceed upon an Equivocation; for the detecting of which there will be need of a Distinction. I observe therefore, that the Term *all over*
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may be taken two ways, either as to the Subject, or as to the Kinds of Immortality. Now if by Mortal *all over* you mean as to the Subject, I grant that if the Soul be Mortal at all, it must be Mortal all over, upon the supposition of its being a pure Spirit, incapable of Parts. But if by Mortal *all over* you mean as to the Kinds of Immortality, as if the Soul's being Mortal as to Existence would conclude also its Mortality as to Incorruptibility, I do not see how this Consequence can be infer'd. Unless you will say that Annihilation and Corruption are the same thing; or that a thing cannot be annihilated unless it be also dissolv'd; which I presume you are too much a Philosopher to say.

71. And now, Sir, if I have not already tired your Patience, give me leave to lead you back as far as the First Argument for the *Compleatness* of the Ideas of a Thinking and Extended Being, (the only *Condition* requisite to their real Distinction) and to offer to your Consideration this farther in Confirmation of it. The Argument is, I who can doubt of the Existence of all Bodies, find that I cannot possibly doubt of the Existence of my own Mind, since that very doubting would evidently prove it. And if I can conceive my own
Mind

Mind as existing even while I doubt whether there be any Body or no, then I may as well conceive a Thinking Being to be, tho' I should suppose Body not to be. This proceeds upon the *Cartesian* Ground, to which I shall now add this farther Confirmation upon the same Ground, tho' with some Peculiarity as to the Form of Reasoning. I can (at my first setting out in the Inquiry of Truth, till upon farther Inquiry I am otherwise satisfy'd) suppose all things not to be, or at least doubt whether they are or no, except my self that think this. And that I can never suppose not to be. Therefore I who think am. And as this shews that I am, so it may perhaps be farther improved to shew *what* I am, as *Descartes* also notes. For if I can in any Instant suppose all things not to be but my self that think, then it seems that my Being or Essence, that I which I call my self, (as far as I can have any Notion of it, and farther we cannot go) must consist in Thought, all other things being supposed to be removed; not precisely, but exclusively removed. Again, I can separate all things from me but Thought, and yet find that I remain in Being. But that I cannot separate from me; and if I do, I presently lose my self, and am no more.

more. But then from the absolute Inseparability of Thought, and its necessity and sufficiency to my Existence, it seems again to follow that this is that wherein my Essence does consist. Or at least (to avoid any wrangling about the Body as belonging to the integrity of Human Nature) that there is an Essence which does consist in it. And if my Essence, or any other, (for 'tis all one to the present purpose) does consist in Thought, then 'tis plain that a Thinking Being is a compleat Idea by it self, and consequently has nothing to do with Extension or Body as to any *Ideal* or Essential Communication, however it may by the Divine Power be otherwise *vitally* united to it, as we find in Fact it is. But that's nothing to their real Distinction.

72. And thus, Sir, after some Delays, I have at length adventured to scribble a few things to you ; but whether worthy of the Argument, or of your Consideration, you are the best Judge. However I hope your Candour will pardon what your Judgment cannot so well approve, and that you have Goodness enough to excuse the Liberty I have taken, and the Trouble that I have given you ; which I could not well decline, without denying you that
Respect

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Respect which is your just Due, and exposing my own want of good Manners. May Almighty God enlighten you with the Beams of his Divine Light, and guide you into the way of Truth ; and the rather, because so great an Authority cannot err *singly*, nor without great Danger and Detriment to the Public. To which that you may be continued as a *long* Blessing, is but a grateful Prayer for the many Obligations you have confer'd upon it, and very heartily said by,

S I R,

Your very Humble,

and Respectful Servant,

JY 61

J. Norris.

F I N I S.



